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Abstract. We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs
with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular
matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been
well-studied in bipartite graphs: they always exist and there is a simple linear time algorithm
to find one.
We show that stable and dominant matchings are the only two tractable subclasses of popular
matchings in bipartite graphs; more precisely, we show that it is NP-complete to decide if G
admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant. We also show a number of
related hardness results, such as (tight) inapproximability of the maximum weight popular
matching problem. In non-bipartite graphs, we show a strong negative result: it is NP-hard
to decide whether a popular matching exists or not, and the same result holds if we replace
popular with dominant. On the positive side, we show the following results in any graph:
– we identify a subclass of dominant matchings called strongly dominant matchings and
show a linear time algorithm to decide if a strongly dominant matching exists or not;
– we show an efficient algorithm to compute a popular matching of minimum cost in a graph
with edge costs and bounded treewidth.
1 Introduction
The marriage problem considered by Gale and Shapley [9] is arguably the most relevant two-sided
market model, and has been studied and applied in many areas of mathematics, computer science,
and economics. The classical model assumes that the input is a complete bipartite graph, and that
each node is endowed with a strict preference list over the set of nodes of the opposite color class. The
goal is to find a matching that respects a certain concept of fairness called stability. An immediate
extension deals with incomplete lists, i.e., it assumes that the input graph is bipartite but not
complete. In this setting, the problem enjoys strong and elegant structural properties, that lead to
fast algorithms for many related optimization problems (a classical reference in this area is [13]).
In order to investigate more realistic scenarios, several extensions of the above Gale-Shapley
model have been investigated. On one hand, one can change the structure of the input, admitting
e.g. ties in preference lists, or of preference patterns that are given by more complex choice functions,
or allow the input graph to be non-bipartite (see e.g. [23] for a collection of extensions). On the other
hand, one can change the requirements of the output, i.e., we could ask for a matching that satisfies
properties other than stability. For instance, relaxing the stability condition to popularity allows us
to overcome one of the main drawbacks of stable matchings and this is its size — the restriction
that blocking pairs are forbidden constrains the size of a stable matching; there are simple instances
where the size of a stable matching is only half the size of a maximum matching (note that a stable
matching is maximal, so its size is at least half the size of a maximum matching).
Popularity is a natural relaxation of stability: roughly speaking, a matching M is popular if the
number of nodes that prefer M to any matching M ′ is at least the number of nodes that prefer M ′
to M . One can show that stable matchings are popular matchings of minimum size, and a maximum
size popular matching can be twice as large as a stable matching. Hence, popularity allows for
matchings of larger size while still guaranteeing a certain fairness condition.
? This paper is a merger of results shown in the arXiv papers [8, 21] along with one in [20] and new results.
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Popular matchings (and variations thereof) have been extensively studied in the discrete op-
timization community, see e.g. [2, 7, 14, 15, 17–19], but there are still large gaps on what we know
on the tractability of optimization problems over the set of popular matchings. Interestingly, all
tractability results in popular matchings rely on connections with stable matchings. For instance,
Kavitha [18] showed that a max-size popular matching can be found efficiently by a combination
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and promotion of nodes rejected once by all neighbors. Cseh and
Kavitha [7] showed that a pair of nodes is matched together in some popular matching if and only if
this pair is matched together either in some stable matching or in some dominant matching. Dom-
inant matchings are a subclass of max-size popular matchings, and these are equivalent (under a
simple linear map) to stable matchings in a larger graph. Recently, Kavitha [20] showed that when
there are weights on edges, the problem of finding a max-weight popular matching is NP-hard.
The notion of popular matchings can be immediately extended to non-bipartite graphs. Popular
matchings need not always exist in a non-bipartite graph and it was not known if one can efficiently
decide if a popular matching exists or not in a given non-bipartite graph.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we show NP-hardness, inapproximability results, and polynomial-
time algorithms for many problems in popular matchings, some of which have been posed as open
questions in many papers in the area (see e.g. [6, 7, 15, 19, 23]). Our most surprising result is probably
the following: it is NP-complete to decide if a bipartite graph has a popular matching that is neither
stable nor dominant (see Theorem 7).
Stable matchings and dominant matchings always exist in bipartite graphs and there are linear
time algorithms to compute these matchings. Recall that a stable matching is a min-size popular
matching and a dominant matching is a max-size popular matching: thus finding a min-size (similarly,
max-size) popular matching is easy. We are not aware of any other natural combinatorial optimization
problem where finding elements of min-size (similarly, max-size) is easy but to decide whether there
exists any element that is neither min-size nor max-size is NP-hard.
We also deduce other hardness results: it is NP-complete to decide if there exists a popular
matching that contains or does not contain two given edges (see Theorem 13 and Section 5.1, where
this and some other positive and negative results are discussed); unless P=NP, the maximum weight
popular matching problem with nonnegative costs cannot be approximated better than a factor 1/2,
and this is tight, since a 1/2-approximation follows by known results (see Theorem 14). Moving
to non-bipartite graphs, we show that the problem of deciding if a popular matching exists is NP-
complete3 (see Theorem 16). We also show that the problem stays NP-complete if we replace popular
with dominant (see Theorem 15).
All together, those negative results settle the main open questions in the area, and cast a dark
shadow on the tractability of popular matchings. While stable matchings are a tractable subclass
of popular matchings in non-bipartite graphs [16], the dominant matching problem is NP-hard in
non-bipartite graphs, as shown here. The fact that stable matchings and dominant matchings are the
only tractable subclasses of popular matchings in bipartite graphs prompts the following question:
is there is a non-trivial subclass of dominant matchings that is tractable in all graphs?
We show the answer to the above question is “yes” by identifying a subclass called strongly
dominant matchings (see Definition 3): in bipartite graphs, these two classes coincide. We show a
simple linear time algorithm for the problem of deciding if a given graph admits a strongly dominant
matching or not and to find one, if so. We also show that a popular matching of minimum cost (with
no restriction on the signs of the cost function) in bipartite and non-bipartite graphs can be found
efficiently if the treewidth of the input graph is bounded.
Background and Related results. Algorithmic questions for popular matchings were first studied
in the domain of one-sided preference lists [1] in bipartite instances where it is only nodes one side,
also called agents, that have preferences over their neighbors, also called objects. Popular matchings
need not always exist here, however fractional matchings that are popular always exist [17].
Popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance G with two-sided strict preference lists [11].
Polynomial time algorithms to compute a max-size popular matching here were given in [14, 18] and
3 Very recently, this result also appeared in [12] on arXiv; our results (from [21]) were obtained independently
and our proofs are different.
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these algorithms always compute dominant matchings. The equivalence between dominant matchings
in the given bipartite graph and stable matchings in a larger bipartite graph shown in [7] implies a
polynomial time algorithm to solve the max-weight popular matching problem in a complete bipartite
graph. It was shown in [20] that it is NP-hard to find a max-size popular matching in a non-bipartite
graph (even when a stable matching exists) and it was shown in [15] that it is UGC-hard to compute
a Θ(1)-approximation of a max-weight popular matching in non-bipartite graphs.
It was very recently shown [22] that given a bipartite graph G along with a parameter k ∈
(min,max), where min is the size of a stable matching and max is the size of a dominant matching,
it is NP-hard to decide whether G admits a popular matching of size k or not. Note that our NP-
hardness result is a much stronger statement as we show that the problem of deciding whether G
admits a popular matching of any intermediate size (rather than a particular size k) is NP-hard.
Organization of the paper. Definitions and important properties of stable and popular matchings
are given in Section 2. A linear time algorithm for strongly dominant matchings is given in Section 3.
Our main gadget construction is given in Section 4, where we also show that the problem of deciding
if a graph admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant is NP-complete. Other
hardness (and some related positive) results are given in Section 5. In Section 6, we give an algorithm
for finding a popular matching of minimum cost in a graph with bounded treewidth.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions
Throughout the paper, we will consider problems where our input is a graph G, together with a
collection of rankings, one per node of G, with each node ranking its neighbors in a strict order of
preference. We will denote an edge of G between nodes u and v as (u, v) or uv. A matching M in
G is stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to M , i.e. an edge whose both endpoints strictly
prefer each other to their respective assignments in M . It follows from the classical work of Gale
and Shapley [9] that a stable matching always exists when G is bipartite and such a matching can
be computed in linear time.
The notion of popularity was introduced by Ga¨rdenfors [11] in 1975. We say a node u prefers
matching M to matching M ′ if either (i) u is matched in M and unmatched in M ′ or (ii) u is
matched in both M,M ′ and u prefers M(u) to M ′(u), where M(u) is the partner of u in M . For
any two matchings M and M ′, let φ(M,M ′) be the number of nodes that prefer M to M ′.
Definition 1. A matching M is popular if φ(M,M ′) ≥ φ(M ′,M) for every matching M ′ in G,
i.e., ∆(M,M ′) ≥ 0 where ∆(M,M ′) = φ(M,M ′)− φ(M ′,M).
Thus, there is no matching M ′ that would defeat a popular matching M in an election between
M and M ′, where each node casts a vote for the matching that it prefers. Since there is no matching
where more nodes are better-off than in a popular matching, a popular matching can be regarded
as a “globally stable matching”. Equivalently, popular matchings are weak Condorcet winners [5] in
the voting instance where nodes are voters and all feasible matchings are the candidates.
Though (weak) Condorcet winners need not exist in a general voting instance, popular matchings
always exist in bipartite graphs, since every stable matching is popular [11]. Popular matchings have
been well-studied in bipartite graphs, in particular, a subclass of max-size popular matchings called
dominant matchings is well-understood [7, 14, 18].
Definition 2. A popular matching M is dominant in G if M is more popular than any larger
matching in G, i.e., ∆(M,M ′) > 0 for any matching M ′ such that |M ′| > |M |.
Dominant matchings always exist in a bipartite graph and such a matching can be computed in
linear time [18]. Every polynomial time algorithm currently known to find a popular matching in a
bipartite graph finds either a stable matching [9] or a dominant matching [14, 18, 7].
In some problems, together with the graph G and the preference lists, we will also be given a
weight function c : E → R. The weight (or cost) of a matching M of G (with respect to c) is defined
as c(M) :=
∑
e∈M c(e).
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2.2 Combinatorial characterization of popular and dominant matchings
Fix a matching M of G. A node u of G is M -exposed if δ(u)∩M = ∅, and M -covered otherwise. An
M -alternating path (resp. cycle) in G is a path (resp. cycle) whose edges alternate between M and
in E(G)\M . An M -alternating path is M -augmenting if its first and last nodes are M -exposed. We
can associate labels to edges from E \M as follows:
– an edge (u, v) is (−,−) if both u and v prefer their respective partners in M to each other;
– (u, v) = (+,+) if u and v prefer each other to their partners in M ;
– (u, v) = (+,−) if u prefers v to its partner in M and v prefers its partner in M to u.
We write (u, v) = (+,+) or uv is a (+,+) edge, and similarly for the other cases. We also say
that the label of (u, v) at u is + (resp. −) if u prefers v to its current partner (resp. its current
partner to v). Note that blocking edges introduced in Section 2.1 coincide exactly with (+,+) edges.
The graph GM is defined as the subgraph of G obtained by deleting edges that are labeled (−,−),
and by attaching to other edges not in M the appropriate labels defined above. Observe that M
is also a matching of GM , hence definitions of M -alternating path and cycles apply in GM as well.
These definitions can be used to obtain a characterization of popular matchings in terms of forbidden
substructures of GM , as shown in [14].
Theorem 1. A matching M of G is popular if and only if GM does not contain any of the following:
(i) an M -alternating cycle with a (+,+) edge.
(ii) an M -alternating path that starts and ends with two distinct (+,+) edges.
(iii) an M -alternating path that starts from an M -exposed node and ends with a (+,+) edge.
Graph GM can also be used to obtain a characterization of dominant matchings, as shown in [7].
Theorem 2. Let M be a popular matching. M is dominant if and only if there is no M -augmenting
path in GM .
The above characterizations can be used to efficiently decide if given a matching M is popular
(similarly, dominant), see [14]. Hence, in most of our NP-completeness reductions, we focus on
proving the hardness part.
The matchings that satisfy Definition 2 were called “dominant” in [7], however dominant match-
ings in bipartite graphs were first constructed in [14]. It was observed in [14] that Definition 3 given
below was a sufficient condition for a matching M to be a max-size popular matching and the goal
in [14] was to efficiently construct such a matching in a bipartite graph. It was shown in [18] that
if M satisfies conditions (i)-(iv) in Definition 3 then M satisfies the condition given in Theorem 2
along with the conditions given in Theorem 1; thus M is a dominant matching.
Definition 3. A matching M is strongly dominant in G = (V,E) if there is a partition (L,R) of
the node set V such that (i) M ⊆ L× R, (ii) M matches all nodes in R, (iii) every (+,+) edge is
in R×R, and (iv) every edge in L× L is (−,−).
Consider the complete graph on 4 nodes d0, d1, d2, d3 where d0’s preference list is d1  d2  d3
(i.e., top choice d1, followed by d2 and then d3), d1’s preference list is d2  d3  d0, d2’s preference
list is d3  d1  d0, and d3’s preference list is d1  d2  d0. This instance (see Fig. 4) has no
stable matching. The matching M = {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} is a strongly dominant matching here with
L = {d0, d2} and R = {d1, d3}. M ⊆ L × R and it is a perfect matching. Moreover, the edge
(d0, d2) ∈ L× L is (−,−) and there is only one (+,+) edge here, which is (d1, d3) ∈ R×R.
In bipartite graphs, every dominant matching is strongly dominant [7]. However in non-bipartite
graphs, not every dominant matching is strongly dominant. For instance, consider the following
graph on 4 nodes a, b, c, d where a’s preference list is b  c  d, while b’s preference list is a  c
and c’s preference list is a  b and d’s only neighbor is a. It is simple to check that the matching
{(a, d), (b, c)} is popular; moreover it is a perfect matching and hence it is dominant. However it is
not strongly dominant as both (a, b) and (a, c) are (+,+) edges and one of b, c has to be in L.
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2.3 Dual certificates for stable, popular, and dominant matchings
Let G˜ be the graph G augmented with self-loops, i.e., it is assumed that every node is its own last
choice. Corresponding to any matching N in G, there is a perfect matching N˜ in G˜ defined as follows:
N˜ = N ∪ {(u, u) : u is left unmatched in N}.
Let M be any matching in G. Corresponding to M , we can define an edge weight function wtM
in G˜ as follows.
wtM (u, v) =

2 if (u, v) is labeled (+,+)
−2 if (u, v) is labeled (−,−)
0 otherwise
Thus wtM (e) = 0 for every e ∈M . We need to define wtM on self-loops as well: for any node u,
let wtM (u, u) = 0 if u is unmatched in M , else let wtM (u, u) = −1. It is easy to see that for any
matching N in G, ∆(N,M) = wtM (N˜), where ∆(N,M) = φ(N,M) − φ(M,N) (see Definition 1).
Thus M is popular if and only if every perfect matching in the graph G˜ has weight at most 0.
Certificates in bipartite graphs. Here we give a quick overview of the LP framework of popular
matchings in bipartite graphs from [17] along with some results from [19, 20].
Theorem 3 ([17]). Let M be any matching in G = (A∪B,E). The matching M is popular if and
only if there exists a vector α ∈ Rn (where n = |A ∪B|) such that ∑u∈A∪B αu = 0 and
αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
The vector α will be an optimal solution to the LP that is dual to the max-weight perfect
matching LP in G˜ (with edge weight function wtM ). For any popular matching M , a vector α as
given in Theorem 3 will be called a witness to M .
A stable matching has the all-zeros vector 0 as a witness while it follows from [7] that a dominant
matching M has a witness α where αu ∈ {±1} for all nodes u matched in M and αu = 0 for all
nodes u left unmatched in M . The following lemma will be useful to us. Let |A ∪B| = n.
Lemma 1 ([19]). Every popular matching in G = (A ∪B,E) has a witness in {0,±1}n.
Call s ∈ V a stable node if it is matched in some (equivalently, all) stable matching(s) [10]. Every
popular matching has to match all stable nodes [14]. A node that is not stable is called an unstable
node.
Call any e ∈ E a popular edge if there is some popular matching in G that contains e. Let M
be a popular matching in G = (A ∪B,E) and let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M . Lemma 2 given
below follows from complementary slackness conditions.
Lemma 2 ([20]). For any popular edge (a, b), we have αa +αb = wtM (a, b). For any unstable node
u in G, if u is left unmatched in M , then αu = 0 else αu = −1.
The popular subgraph FG is a useful subgraph of G defined in [20].
Definition 4. The popular subgraph FG = (A ∪ B,EF ) is the subgraph of G = (A ∪ B,E) whose
edge set EF is the set of popular edges in E.
The graph FG need not be connected. Let C1, . . . , Ch be the various components in FG. Recall
that M is a popular matching in G and α ∈ {0,±1}n is a witness of M .
Lemma 3 ([20]). For any connected component Ci in FG, either αu = 0 for all nodes u ∈ Ci or
αu ∈ {±1} for all nodes u ∈ Ci. Moreover, if Ci contains one or more unstable nodes, either all these
unstable nodes are matched in M or none of them is matched in M .
The following definition marks the state of each connected component Ci in FG as “zero” or
“unit” in α — this classification will be useful to us in our hardness reduction.
Definition 5. A connected component Ci in FG is in zero state in α if αu = 0 for all nodes u ∈ Ci.
Similarly, Ci in FG is in unit state in α if αu ∈ {±1} for all nodes u ∈ Ci.
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Certificates in non-bipartite graphs. The following theorem shows that the sufficient condition
in Theorem 3 certifies popularity in non-bipartite graphs as well.
Theorem 4. Let M be any matching in G = (V,E). The matching M is popular if there exists
α ∈ R|V | such that ∑u∈V αu = 0 and
αu + αv ≥ wtM (u, v) ∀ (u, v) ∈ E
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ V.
The proof of Theorem 4 follows by considering the max-weight perfect matching LP in the graph
G˜ with edge weight function wtM as the primal LP. It is easy to see that if there exists a vector
α ∈ R|V | as given above then the optimal value of the dual LP is at most 0, equivalently, wtM (N˜) ≤ 0
for all matchings N in G, i.e., M is a popular matching.
If M is a popular matching that admits α ∈ R|V | satisfying the conditions in Theorem 4, we will
call α a witness of M .
Note that any stable matching in G has 0 as a witness. The witness of the matching M described
in Section 2.2 on the nodes d0, d1, d2, d3 is α where αd1 = αd3 = 1 and αd0 = αd2 = −1. Consider the
popular (but not strongly dominant) matching M = {(a, d), (b, c)} in the other instance described
in Section 2.2: this matching M does not admit any witness as given in Theorem 4.
We will show in Section 3 that every strongly dominant matching M admits a witness α as
given in Theorem 4; moreover, there will be a witness α such that for every node u matched in M ,
αu = ±1.
3 Strongly dominant matchings
In this section we generalize the max-size popular matching algorithm for bipartite graphs [18] to
solve the strongly dominant matching problem in all graphs. We show a surprisingly simple reduction
from the strongly dominant matching problem in G = (V,E) to the stable matching problem in a
new graph G′ = (V,E′). Thus Irving’s algorithm [16], which efficiently solves the stable matching
problem in all graphs, when run in G′, solves our problem.
The graph G′ can be visualized as the bidirected graph corresponding to G. The node set of G′
is the same as that of G. For every (u, v) ∈ E, there will be 2 edges in G′ between u and v: one
directed from u to v which will be denoted by (u+, v−) or (v−, u+) and the other directed from v to
u which will be denoted by (u−, v+) or (v+, u−).
For any u ∈ V , if u’s preference list in G is v1  v2  · · ·  vk then u’s preference list in G′ is
v−1  v−2  · · ·  v−k  v+1  v+2  · · ·  v+k . The neighbor v−i corresponds to the edge (u+, v−i ) and
the neighbor v+i corresponds to the edge (u
−, v+i ). Thus u prefers outgoing edges to incoming edges:
among outgoing edges (similarly, incoming edges), its order is its original preference order.
– A matching M ′ in G′ is a subset of E′ such that for each u ∈ V , M ′ contains at most one edge
incident to u, i.e., at most one edge in {(u+, v−), (u−, v+) : v ∈ Nbr(u)} is in M ′, where Nbr(u)
is the set of u’s neighbors in G.
– For any matching M ′ in G′, define the projection M of M ′ as follows:
M = {(u, v) : (u+, v−) or (u−, v+) is in M ′}.
It is easy to see that M is a matching in G.
Definition 6. A matching M ′ is stable in G′ if for every edge (u+, v−) ∈ E′ \M ′: either (i) u is
matched in M ′ to a neighbor ranked better than v− or (ii) v is matched in M ′ to a neighbor ranked
better than u+.
We now present our algorithm to find a strongly dominant matching in G = (V,E).
1. Build the bidirected graph G′ = (V,E′).
2. Run Irving’s stable matching algorithm in G′.
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3. If a stable matching M ′ is found in G′ then return the projection M of M ′.
Else return “G has no strongly dominant matching”.
Note that running Irving’s algorithm in the bidirected graph G′ is exactly the same as running
Irving’s algorithm in the simple undirected graph H that has three copies of each node u ∈ V : these
are u+, u−, and d(u). Corresponding to each edge (u, v) in G, there will be the two edges (u+, v−)
and (u−, v+) in H and for each u ∈ V , the graph H also has the edges (u+, d(u)) and (u−, d(u)).
If u’s preference list in G is v1  v2  · · ·  vk then u+’s preference list in H will be v−1  v−2 
· · ·  v−k  d(u) and u−’s preference list will be d(u)  v+1  v+2  · · ·  v+k . The preference list of
d(u) will be u+  u−. Thus in any stable matching in H, one of u+, u− has to be matched to d(u).
Before we prove the correctness of our algorithm, we will characterize strongly dominant match-
ings in terms of their witnesses.
Theorem 5. A matching M is strongly dominant in G if and only if there exists α that satisfies
Theorem 4 such that αu = ±1 for all nodes u matched in M and αu = 0 for all u unmatched in M .
Proof. Let M be a strongly dominant matching in G = (V,E). So V can be partitioned into L ∪R
such that properties (i)-(iv) in Definition 3 are satisfied. We will construct α as follows. For u ∈ V :
– if u ∈ R then set αu = 1
– else set αu = −1 for u matched in M and αu = 0 for u unmatched in M .
Since M matches all nodes in R, all nodes unmatched in M are in L. Thus αu = 0 for all u
unmatched in M and αu = ±1 for all u matched in M . For any edge (u, v) ∈M , since M ⊆ L×R,
(αu, αv) ∈ {(1,−1), (−1, 1)} and so αu + αv = 0. Thus
∑
u∈V αu = 0.
We will now show that α satisfies Theorem 4. We claim that αu ≥ wtM (u, u). This is because
αu = 0 = wtM (u, u) for u left unmatched in M and αu ≥ −1 = wtM (u, u) for u matched in M .
We will now show that αu + αv ≥ wtM (u, v) for any edge (u, v) in G, i.e., the edge (u, v) is covered.
Recall that wtM (u, v) ∈ {0,±2}.
– Since wtM (e) ≤ 2 for any edge e and αu = 1 for all u ∈ R, all edges in R×R are covered.
– We also know that any edge in L × L is labeled (−,−), i.e., wtM (u, v) = −2 for any edge
(u, v) ∈ L× L. Since αu ≥ −1 for any u ∈ L, edges in L× L are covered.
– We also know that all (+,+) edges are in R × R and so wtM (u, v) ≤ 0 for all (u, v) ∈ L × R.
Since αu ≥ −1 for u ∈ L and αv = 1 for v ∈ R, all edges in L×R are covered.
We will now show the converse. Let M be a matching with a witness α as given in the statement
of the theorem. The matching M is popular (by Theorem 4). Note that we can interpret α as the
optimal solution to the dual LP of the maximum weight perfect matching LP in G˜ with weights
given by wtM (u, v), of which M˜ is an optimal solution (since M is popular). Hence, the pair (M˜,α)
satisfy complementary slackness conditions.
In order to show M is strongly dominant, we will obtain a partition (L,R) of V as follows: let
R = {u : αu = 1} and L = {u : αu is either 0 or -1}. Complementary slackness conditions on the dual
LP imply that if (u, v) ∈M then αu + αv = wtM (u, v) = 0. Since u, v are matched, αu, αv ∈ {±1};
so one of u, v is in L and the other is in R. Thus M ⊆ L×R.
We have wtM (u, v) ≤ αu + αv for every (u, v) ∈ E. There cannot be any edge between 2 nodes
left unmatched in M as that would contradict M ’s popularity. So wtM (u, v) ≤ αu + αv ≤ −1 for
all (u, v) ∈ E ∩ (L× L). Since wtM (u, v) ∈ {0,±2}, wtM (u, v) = −2 for all edges (u, v) in L× L. In
other words, every edge in L× L is labeled (−,−).
Moreover, any (+,+) edge can be present only in R × R since wtM (u, v) ≤ αu + αv ≤ 1 for all
edges (u, v) ∈ L×R. Finally, since αu = wtM (u, u) = 0 for all u unmatched in M (by complementary
slackness conditions on the dual LP) and every node u ∈ R satisfies αu = 1, it means that all nodes
in R are matched in M . uunionsq
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3.1 Correctness of our algorithm
We will first show that if our algorithm returns a matching M , then M is a strongly dominant
matching in G.
Lemma 4. If M ′ is a stable matching in G′ then the projection of M ′ is a strongly dominant
matching in G.
Proof. Let M be the projection of M ′. In order to show that M is a strongly dominant matching in
G, we will construct a witness α as given in Theorem 5.
Set αu = 0 for all nodes u left unmatched in M . For each node u matched in M :
– if (u+, ∗) ∈M ′ then set αu = 1; else set αu = −1.
Note that
∑
u∈V αu = 0 since for each edge (a, b) ∈M (so either (a+, b−) or (a−, b+) is in M ′),
we have αa + αb = 0 and for each node u that is unmatched in M , we have αu = 0 . We also have
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) for all u ∈ V since (i) αu = 0 = wtM (u, u) for all u left unmatched in M and
(ii) αu ≥ −1 = wtM (u, u) for all u matched in M .
We will now show that for every (a, b) ∈ E, αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b).
1. Suppose (a+, ∗) ∈M ′. So αa = 1. We will consider 3 subcases here.
– The first subcase is that (b+, ∗) ∈ M ′. So αb = 1. Since wtM (a, b) ≤ 2, it follows that
αa + αb = 2 ≥ wtM (a, b).
– The second subcase is that (b−, ∗) ∈ M ′. So αb = −1. If (a+, b−) ∈ M ′ then wtM (a, b) =
0 = αa + αb. So assume (a
+, c−) and (b−, d+) belong to M ′. Since M ′ is stable, the edge
(a+, b−) does not block M ′. Thus either (i) a prefers c− to b− or (ii) b prefers d+ to a+.
Hence wtM (a, b) ∈ {0,−2} and so αa + αb = 0 ≥ wtM (a, b).
– The third subcase is that b is unmatched in M . So αb = 0. Since M
′ is stable, the edge
(a+, b−) does not block M ′. Thus a prefers its partner in M ′ to b− and so wtM (a, b) = 0 <
αa + αb.
2. Suppose (a−, ∗) ∈M . There are 3 subcases here as before. The case where (b+, ∗) ∈M is totally
analogous to the case where (a+, ∗) and (b−, ∗) are in M . So we will consider the remaining 2
subcases here.
– The first subcase is that (b−, ∗) ∈ M ′. So αb = −1. Let (a−, c+) and (b−, d+) belong
to M ′. Since M ′ is stable, the edge (a+, b−) does not block M ′. So b prefers d+ to a+.
Similarly, the edge (a−, b+) does not block M ′. Hence a prefers c+ to b+. Thus both a and
b prefer their respective partners in M to each other, i.e., wtM (a, b) = −2. So we have
αa + αb = −2 = wtM (a, b).
– The second subcase is that b is unmatched in M . Then the edge (a+, b−) blocks M ′ since
a prefers b− to c+ (for any neighbor c) and b prefers to be matched to a+ than be left
unmatched. Since M ′ is stable and has no blocking edge, this means that this subcase does
not arise.
3. Suppose a is unmatched in M . Then (b+, ∗) ∈ M ′ (otherwise (a−, b+) blocks M ′); moreover, b
prefers its partner in M ′ to a−. So we have wtM (a, b) = 0 < αa + αb.
Thus we always have αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b). Since α satisfies the conditions in Theorem 5, M is a
strongly dominant matching in G.
We will now show that if G′ has no stable matching, then G has no strongly dominant matching.
Lemma 5. If G admits a strongly dominant matching then G′ admits a stable matching.
Proof. Let M be a strongly dominant matching in G = (V,E). Let α be a witness of M as given
in Theorem 5. That is, αu = 0 for u unmatched in M and αu = ±1 for u matched in M . As done
in the proof of Theorem 5, we can interpret (M˜,α) as a pair of optimal primal and dual solutions.
Hence, for each (u, v) ∈ M , αu + αv = wtM (u, v) = 0 by complementary slackness on the dual LP,
so (αu, αv) is either (1,−1) or (−1, 1).
We will construct a stable matching M ′ in G′ as follows. For each (u, v) ∈M :
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– if (αu, αv) = (1,−1) then add (u+, v−) to M ′; else add (u−, v+) to M ′.
We will show that no edge in E′ \M ′ blocks M ′. Let (a+, b−) /∈ M ′. We consider the following
cases here:
Case 1. Suppose αb = 1. Then (b
+, d−) ∈ M ′ where d = M(b). Since b prefers d− to a+, (a+, b−)
is not a blocking edge to M ′.
Case 2. Suppose αb = −1. Then (b−, d+) ∈ M ′ where d = M(b). We have 2 sub-cases here:
(i) αa = 1 and (ii) αa = −1. Note that αa 6= 0 as the edge (a, b) would not be covered by αa + αb
then. This is because if αa = 0 then a is unmatched in M and wtM (a, b) = 0 while αa + αb = −1.
– In sub-case (i), some edge (a+, c−) belongs to M ′. We know that wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb = 0, so
either (1) a prefers M(a) = c to b or (2) b prefers M(b) = d to a. Hence either (1) a prefers c−
to b− or (2) b prefers d+ to a+. Thus (a+, b−) is not a blocking edge to M ′.
– In sub-case (ii), some edge (a−, c+) belongs to M ′. We know that wtM (a, b) ≤ αa +αb = −2, so
a prefers M(a) = c to b and b prefers M(b) = d to a. Thus b prefers d+ to a+, hence (a+, b−) is
not a blocking edge to M ′.
Case 3. Suppose αb = 0. Thus b was unmatched in M . Each of b’s neighbors has to be matched in M
to a neighbor that it prefers to b, otherwise M would be unpopular. We have αa+αb ≥ wtM (a, b) = 0,
hence it follows that αa = 1. Thus (a
+, c−) ∈M ′ where c is a neighbor that a prefers to b. So (a+, b−)
is not a blocking edge to M ′. uunionsq
Lemmas 4 and 5 show that a strongly dominant matching is present in G if and only if a stable
matching is present in G′. This finishes the proof of correctness of our algorithm. Since Irving’s
stable matching algorithm in G′ can be implemented to run in linear time [16], we can conclude the
following theorem.
Theorem 6. There is a linear time algorithm to determine if a graph G = (V,E) with strict pref-
erence lists admits a strongly dominant matching or not and if so, to return one.
4 Finding a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant
This section is devoted to proving the following result.
Theorem 7. Given a bipartite instance G = (A ∪ B,E) with strict preference lists, the problem of
deciding if G admits a popular matching that is neither a stable matching nor a dominant matching
is NP-hard.
Our reduction will be from 1-in-3 SAT. Recall that 1-in-3 SAT is the set of 3CNF formulas with
no negated variables such that there is a satisfying assignment that makes exactly one variable true
in each clause. Given an input formula φ, to determine if φ is 1-in-3 satisfiable or not is NP-hard [25].
We will now build a bipartite instance G = (A∪B,E). The node set A∪B will consist of nodes
in 4 levels: levels 0, 1, 2, and 3 along with 4 nodes a0, b0, z, and z
′. Nodes in (A ∪B) \ {a0, b0, z, z′}
are partitioned into gadgets that appear in some level i, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. For each variable in our
1-in-3 SAT formula, we construct a variable gadget (in level 1), and for each clause, we construct
three clause gadgets in level 0, three in level 2, and one in level 3.
We will show that every gadget forms a separate connected component in the popular subgraph
of G. If M is any popular matching in G that is neither a stable matching nor a dominant matching
and α is any witness of M then it will be the case that every level 0 gadget in G is in zero state in
α and every level 3 gadget in G is in unit state in α. This will force the following property to hold
for every clause in φ:
– if c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk then among the gadgets corresponding to Xi, Xj , Xk in level 1, exactly one
is in unit state in α.
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Thus a popular matching in G that is neither stable nor dominant will yield a 1-in-3 satisfiable
assignment to φ. Conversely, if φ is 1-in-3 satisfiable then we can build a popular matching in G
that is neither stable nor dominant. We describe our gadgets below.
Level 1 nodes. Every gadget in level 1 is a variable gadget. Corresponding to each variable Xi, we
will have the gadget in Fig. 1. The preference lists of the 4 nodes in the gadget corresponding to Xi
are as follows:
xi : yi  y′i  z  · · · yi : xi  x′i  z′  · · ·
x′i : yi  y′i  · · · y′i : xi  x′i  · · ·
The nodes in the gadget corresponding to Xi are also adjacent to nodes in the clause gadgets:
these neighbors belong to the “· · · ” part of the preference lists. Note that the order among the nodes
in the “· · · ” part in the above preference lists does not matter.
  
  


 
 


 
 
 



  
  
  



xi yi
y′i
11
2
2x
′
i
1 1
2
2
Fig. 1. The gadget corresponding to variable Xi: node preferences are indicated on edges. The node yi is
the top choice of both xi and x
′
i and the node y
′
i is the second choice of both xi and x
′
i. The node xi is the
top choice of both yi and y
′
i and the node x
′
i is the second choice of both yi and y
′
i.
Let c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk be a clause in φ. We will describe the gadgets that correspond to c. For
the sake of readability, when we describe preference lists below, we drop the superscript c from all
the nodes appearing in gadgets corresponding to clause c.
Level 0 nodes. There will be three level 0 gadgets, each on 4 nodes, corresponding to clause c. See
Fig. 2. We describe below the preference lists of the 4 nodes ac1, b
c
1, a
c
2, b
c
2 that belong to the leftmost
gadget.
a1 : b1  y′j  b2  z b1 : a2  x′k  a1  z′
a2 : b2  b1 b2 : a1  a2
Neighbors that are outside this gadget are underlined. The preferences of nodes in the other two
gadgets in level 0 corresponding to c (act , b
c
t for t = 3, 4 and a
c
t , b
c
t for t = 5, 6) are analogous.
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

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bc1
bc2a
c
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ac4
ac3 b
c
3
bc4
ac5
ac6 b
c
6
bc5a
c
1
3
3
3
3 3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
Fig. 2. Corresponding to clause c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk, we have the above 3 gadgets in level 0. The node ac1’s
second choice is y′j and b
c
1’s is x
′
k, similarly, a
c
3’s is y
′
k and b
c
3’s is x
′
i, also a
c
5’s is y
′
i and b
c
5’s is x
′
j .
We will now describe the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to clause c. See Fig. 3.
Level 2 nodes. There will be three level 2 gadgets, each on 6 nodes, corresponding to clause c. The
preference lists of the nodes pct , q
c
t for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 are described below.
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p0 : q0  q2 q0 : p0  p2  z′  s0
p1 : q1  q2  z q1 : p1  p2
p2 : q0  yj  q1  q2  · · · q2 : p1  xk  p0  p2  · · ·
The “· · · ” in the preference lists of p2 and q2 above are to nodes tci0 and sci0 respectively (in a
level 3 gadget), for all clauses ci. The order among these neighbors is not important.
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
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c
0
qc2p
c
2
qc3
qc5p
c
5
pc6
pc8
qc6
qc8
qc1p
c
1
qc4 pc7 q
c
7
1 1
11
22
22
1 3
4 4
31
1 1
1 1
2
2
4 4
1 13 3
pc4 2
pc3 2
1 1
11
22
22
4 4
1 13 3
Fig. 3. We have the above 3 gadgets in level 2 corresponding to c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk . The node pc2’s second
choice is yj and q
c
2’s is xk, similarly, p
c
5’s is yk and q
c
5’s is xi, similarly p
c
8’s is yi and q
c
8’s is xj .
Let us note the preference lists of p2 and q2: they are each other’s fourth choices. The node p2
regards q0 as its top choice, yj as its second choice, and q1 as its third choice. The node q2 regards
p1 as its top choice, xk as its second choice, and p0 as its third choice.
The preferences of nodes pct , q
c
t for 3 ≤ t ≤ 5 are described below. The “· · · ” in the preference
lists of p5 and q5 above are to nodes t
ci
0 and s
ci
0 respectively, for all clauses ci.
p3 : q3  q5 q3 : p3  p5  z′  s0
p4 : q4  q5  z  t0 q4 : p4  p5
p5 : q3  yk  q4  q5  · · · q5 : p4  xi  p3  p5  · · ·
The preferences of nodes pct , q
c
t for 6 ≤ t ≤ 8 are described below. The “· · · ” in the preference
lists of p8 and q8 above are to nodes t
ci
0 and s
ci
0 respectively, for all clauses ci.
p6 : q6  q8 q6 : p6  p8  z′
p7 : q7  q8  z  t0 q7 : p7  p8
p8 : q6  yi  q7  q8  · · · q8 : p7  xj  p6  p8  · · ·
Level 3 nodes. Gadgets in level 3 are again clause gadgets. There is exactly one level 3 gadget on 8
nodes sci , t
c
i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, corresponding to clause c.
s0 : t1  q0  t2  q3  t3  · · · t0 : s3  p7  s2  p4  s1  · · ·
s1 : t1  t0 t1 : s1  s0
s2 : t2  t0 t2 : s2  s0
s3 : t3  t0 t3 : s3  s0
The preference lists of the 8 nodes in the level 3 gadget corresponding to clause c are described
above. It is important to note the preference lists of s0 and t0 here.
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Among neighbors in this gadget, s0’s order is t1  t2  t3 while t0’s order is s3  s2  s1.
Also, s0’s order is interleaved with q0  q3 (these are nodes from level 2 gadgets) and t0’s order is
interleaved with p7  p4.
The “· · · ” in the preference lists of s0 and t0 above are to neighbors in levels 1 and 2. Let n0
be the number of variables in φ. All the nodes y′1, . . . , y
′
n0 along with q
ci
2 , q
ci
5 , q
ci
8 for all clauses ci
will be at the tail of the preference list of sc0 and the order among all these nodes is not important.
Similarly, all the nodes x′1, . . . , x
′
n0 along with p
ci
2 , p
ci
5 , p
ci
8 for all clauses ci will be at the tail of the
preference list of tc0 and the order among all these nodes is also not important.
There are four more nodes in G. These are a0, z
′ ∈ A and b0, z ∈ B. Thus we have
A = ∪c{aci : 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} ∪i {xi, x′i} ∪c {pci : 0 ≤ i ≤ 8} ∪c {sci : 0 ≤ i ≤ 3} ∪ {a0, z′}
B = ∪c{bci : 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} ∪i {yi, y′i} ∪c {qci : 0 ≤ i ≤ 8} ∪c {tci : 0 ≤ i ≤ 3} ∪ {b0, z}.
The neighbors of a0 are b0, z and the neighbors of b0 are a0, z
′. The node a0’s preference list is
b0  z and the node b0’s preference list is a0  z′.
The set of neighbors of z is {a0} ∪i {xi} ∪c {ac1, ac3, ac5} ∪c {pc1, pc4, pc7} and the set of neighbors of
z′ is {b0} ∪i {yi} ∪c {bc1, bc3, bc5} ∪c {qc0, qc3, qc6}. The preference lists of z and z′ are as follows: (here k
is the number of clauses in φ)
z : x1  · · ·  xn0  pc11  · · ·  pck7  a0  · · ·
z′ : y1  · · ·  yn0  qc10  · · ·  qck6  b0  · · ·
Thus z prefers neighbors in level 1 to neighbors in level 2, then comes a0, and then neighbors
in level 0. Analogously, for z′ (with b0 replacing a0). The order among neighbors in level i (for
i = 0, 1, 2) in the preference lists of z and z′ does not matter.
4.1 Some stable/dominant matchings in G
It would be helpful to see some stable matchings and dominant matchings in the above instance G.
– The men-optimal stable matching S in G includes (a0, b0) and in the level 0 gadgets, for all
clauses c, the edges (aci , b
c
i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6.
• In the level 1 gadgets, the edges (xi, yi) and (x′i, y′i) are included for all i ∈ [n0].
• In the level 2 gadgets, for all clauses c, the edges (pci , qci ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ 8 are included.
• In the level 3 gadgets, for all clauses c, the edges (sci , tci ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 are included.
• The nodes z, z′ and sc0, tc0 for all clauses c are left unmatched in S.
– The women-optimal stable matching S′ in G includes (a0, b0) and the same edges as S in all
level 1, 2, 3 gadgets. In level 0, S′ includes for all clauses c, the edges (ac1, b
c
2), (a
c
2, b
c
1),(a
c
3, b
c
4),(a
c
4, b
c
3),
(ac5, b
c
6), (a
c
6, b
c
5).
– The dominant matching M∗ as computed by the algorithm in [18] will be as follows:
• M∗ contains the edges (a0, z), (z′, b0), and in the level 0 gadgets, for all clauses c, the edges
(ac1, b
c
2), (a
c
2, b
c
1),(a
c
3, b
c
4),(a
c
4, b
c
3), (a
c
5, b
c
6), (a
c
6, b
c
5).
• In the level 1 gadgets, the edges (xi, y′i) and (xi, y′i) are included for all i ∈ [n0].
• In the level 2 gadgets, for each clause c, the edges (pc0, qc2), (pc1, qc1), (pc2, qc0) are included from
the leftmost gadget (see Fig. 3). Analogous edges (two blue ones and the middle red edge)
are included from the other two level 2 gadgets corresponding to c.
• In the level 3 gadgets, the edges (sc0, tc1), (sc1, tc0), (sc2, tc2), (sc3, tc3) for all clauses c are included.
Note that M∗ is a perfect matching as it matches all nodes in G. We can show the above matching
M∗ to be popular by the following witness α ∈ {±1}n to M∗:
– αa0 = αb0 = 1 while αz = αz′ = −1.
– αaci = 1 and αbci = −1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 and all clauses c.
– αxi = αyi = 1 while αx′i = αy′i = −1 for all i ∈ [n0].
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– αpc0 = αqc0 = αpc1 = 1 while αqc1 = αpc2 = αqc2 = −1 for all clauses c. Similarly for the other 2
level 2 gadgets corresponding to c and all other clauses.
– αsc1 = αtc1 = αsc2 = αsc3 = 1 while αsc0 = αtc0 = αtc2 = αtc3 = −1 for all clauses c.
It can be checked that we have αu +αv = 0 for every edge (u, v) ∈M∗. We also have αu +αv ≥
wtM∗(u, v) for every edge (u, v) in the graph. In particular, the endpoints of every blocking edge to
M∗, such as (a0, b0), (xi, yi) for all i, (pc3j , q
c
3j) for all c and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and (sc1, tc1) for all c, have
their α-value equal to 1.
There are many other dominant matchings in this instance G:
– The edges (aci , b
c
i ) may be included for i ∈ {1, · · · , 6} and all clauses c.
– The top red edge and two green ones (such as the edges (pc0, q
c
0), (p
c
1, q
c
2), (p
c
2, q
c
1) in the leftmost
level 2 gadget corresponding to c) may be included from a level 2 gadget.
– From the level 3 gadget corresponding to c, the edges (sc0, t
c
2), (s
c
1, t
c
1), (s
c
2, t
c
0), (s
c
3, t
c
3) or the edges
(sc0, t
c
3), (s
c
1, t
c
1), (s
c
2, t
c
2), (s
c
3, t
c
0) may be included.
4.2 The popular subgraph of G
Recall the popular subgraph FG from Section 2, whose edge set is the set of popular edges in G.
Lemma 6. Let C be any level i gadget in G, where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. All the nodes in C belong to the
same connected component in FG.
Proof. Consider a level 0 gadget in G, say on ac1, b
c
1, a
c
2, b
c
2 (see Fig. 2). The men-optimal stable
matching S in G contains the edges (ac1, b
c
1) and (a
c
2, b
c
2) while the women-optimal stable matching
S′ contains the edges (ac1, b
c
2) and (a
c
2, b
c
1). Thus there are popular edges among these 4 nodes and
so these 4 nodes belong to the same connected component in FG.
Consider a level 1 gadget in G, say on xi, yi, x
′
i, y
′
i (see Fig. 1). Every stable matching in G
contains (xi, yi) and (x
′
i, y
′
i) while the dominant matching M
∗ contains (xi, y′i) and (x
′
i, yi). Thus
there are popular edges among these 4 nodes and so these 4 nodes belong to the same connected
component in FG.
Consider a level 2 gadget in G, say on pci , q
c
i for i = 0, 1, 2 (see Fig. 3). The dominant matching
M∗ contains the edges (pc0, q
c
2) and (p
c
2, q
c
0). There is also another dominant matching in G that
contains the edges (pc1, q
c
2) and (p
c
2, q
c
1). Thus there are popular edges among these 6 nodes and so
these 6 nodes belong to the same connected component in FG.
Consider a level 3 gadget in G, say on sci , t
c
i for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. The dominant matching M
∗ contains
(sc0, t
c
1), and (s
c
1, t
c
0). There is another dominant matching in G that contains (s
c
0, t
c
2) and (s
c
2, t
c
0).
There is yet another dominant matching in G that contains (sc0, t
c
3) and (s
c
3, t
c
0). Thus there are
popular edges among these 8 nodes and so these 8 nodes belong to the same connected component
in FG. uunionsq
The following theorem will be important for us and we will prove it in Section 4.6.
Theorem 8. Every level i gadget, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, forms a distinct connected component in the
graph FG. The four nodes a0, b0, z, and z
′ belong to their own connected component in FG.
4.3 Popular matchings in G
Let M be any popular matching in G. Note that M either matches both z and z′ or leaves both
these nodes unmatched. This is because both z and z′ are unstable nodes in the same connected
component in FG (by Theorem 8), so either both are matched or both are unmatched in M (by
Lemma 3). It is similar with nodes sc0 and t
c
0 for any clause c: any popular matching either matches
both sc0 and t
c
0 or leaves both these nodes unmatched.
Lemma 7. Suppose M is a popular matching in G that matches z and z′. Then M is a dominant
matching in G.
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Proof. Let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M . It follows from Theorem 8 that (a0, z) and (z′, b0) are
in M . Since z and z′ prefer their neighbors in level 1 to a0 and b0 respectively while these neighbors
prefer their partners in M to z and z′ (by Theorem 8), we have wtM (xi, z) = wtM (z′, yi) = 0.
The nodes z and z′ are unstable in G and M matches them, so αz = αz′ = −1 (by Lemma 2).
Since αxi + αz ≥ 0 and αz′ + αyi ≥ 0, it follows that αxi = αyi = 1 for all i. Thus all nodes in
level 1 have α-values equal to ±1 (by Lemma 3). In particular, αx′i = αy′i = −1. This is due to the
fact that wtM (xi, y
′
i) = 0 (by Theorem 8) and αxi + αy′i = wtM (xi, y
′
i) (by Lemma 2) as (xi, y
′
i) is a
popular edge. Similarly, with (x′i, yi).
Suppose sc0, t
c
0 are unmatched in M . Then wtM (s
c
0, y
′
i) = wtM (x
′
i, t
c
0) = 0. This is because s
c
0
and tc0 prefer to be matched to any neighbor than be unmatched while (by Theorem 8) y
′
i and x
′
i
prefer their partners in M to sc0 and t
c
0, respectively. Since we assumed s
c
0, t
c
0 to be unmatched in
M , αsc0 = αtc0 = 0 (by Lemma 2). So this implies that αs0 +αy′i = 0− 1 < wtM (sc0, y′i), i.e., the edge
(sc0, y
′
i) (similarly, (x
′
i, t
c
0)) is not covered by the sum of α-values of its endpoints, a contradiction.
Thus sc0, t
c
0 are forced to be matched in M .
Thus sc0 and t
c
0 for all clauses c are matched in M . The other nodes in G are stable and hence
they have to be matched in M . Thus M is a perfect matching and also popular, so it is a dominant
matching in G. uunionsq
Lemma 8. Suppose M is a popular matching in G that leaves sc0 and t
c
0 unmatched for some c.
Then M is a stable matching in G.
Proof. We will repeatedly use Theorem 8 here. Let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M . Since the
nodes sc0 and t
c
0 are unmatched in M , we have αsc0 = αtc0 = 0 (by Lemma 2). Also wtM (s
c
0, q
c
2) =
wtM (p
c
2, t
c
0) = 0 since both s
c
0 and t
c
0 prefer to be matched than be unmatched while q
c
2 and p
c
2 prefer
their partners in M to sc0 and t
c
0, respectively (by Theorem 8). So αpc2 ≥ 0 and αqc2 ≥ 0 for all c.
We also have αpc2 +αqc2 = wtM (p
c
2, q
c
2) ≤ 0 since any popular matching matches pc2 to a partner at
least as good as qc2 and similarly, q
c
2 to a partner at least as good as p
c
2 (by Theorem 8). This means
that αpc2 = αqc2 = 0. The same argument can be used for every p
ci
3j+2 and q
ci
3j+2 (for any clause ci
and j = 0, 1, 2) to show that αpci3j+2
= αqci3j+2
= 0. Thus all level 2 nodes have α-values equal to 0
(by Lemmas 3 and 6).
The fact that all level 2 nodes have α-values equal to 0 immediately implies that all level 3 nodes
also have α-values equal to 0. This is because if M matches sci0 and t
ci
0 for some clause ci then at least
one of sci0 , t
ci
0 is not matched to its top choice neighbor in its gadget. So either wtM (s
ci
0 , q
ci
0 ) = 0
or wtM (p
ci
7 , t
ci
0 ) = 0. Since αqci0 = αp
ci
7
= 0 (these are level 2 nodes) and αsci0 = αt
ci
0
= −1 (by
Lemma 2), we have a contradiction. Thus αu = 0 for every level 3 node u (by Lemma 3).
Similarly, αx′i ≥ 0 and αy′i ≥ 0 for all r as the edges (x′i, tc0) and (sc0, y′i) would not be covered
otherwise. Also, αx′i +αy′i = wtM (x
′
i, y
′
i) (by Lemma 2) as (x
′
i, y
′
i) is a popular edge and wtM (x
′
i, y
′
i) ≤
0 since M matches x′i to either yi or y
′
i and similarly, y
′
i to either xi or x
′
i (by Theorem 8). Thus
αx′i = αy′i = 0. This means that all level 1 nodes have α-values equal to 0 (by Lemma 3).
Since all level 1 nodes have α-values equal to 0, we have αz = αz′ = 0; otherwise the edges (xi, z)
and (z′, yi) would not be covered. This is because wtM (xi, z) = wtM (z′, yi) = 0 (by Theorem 8). So
in order to cover the edges (xi, z) and (z
′, yi), we need to have αz ≥ 0 and αz′ ≥ 0, i.e., αz = αz′ = 0
(by Lemma 2). Thus αa0 = αb0 = 0 (by Theorem 8 and Lemma 3).
Moreover, αz = αz′ = 0 also implies that all their neighbors in level 0 have their α-values at
least 0. For instance, consider ac1 and b
c
1: in order to cover the edges (a
c
1, z) and (z
′, bc1), we have
αac1 ≥ 0 and αbc1 ≥ 0. Since either (ac1, bc1) ∈M or (ac1, bc2), (ac2, bc1) are in M (by Theorem 8), we have
wtM (a
c
1, b
c
1) = 0. Because (a
c
1, b
c
1) is a popular edge, this means αac1 + αbc1 = 0 (by Lemma 2). Thus
αac1 = αbc1 = 0.
Similarly, αac2i−1 = αbc2i−1 = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 and all clauses c. Thus all level 0 nodes have α-values
equal to 0. So α = 0, i.e., wtM (e) ≤ 0 for all edges e. In other words, there is no blocking edge to
M . Thus M is a stable matching. uunionsq
It follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 that if M is a popular matching in G that is neither stable nor
dominant then M has to match nodes sc0, t
c
0 for all c and leave z and z
′ unmatched. Equivalently,
M has to match all nodes except z and z′.
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Conversely, if M is a popular matching in G that matches all nodes except z and z′ then M is
neither a max-size popular matching nor a min-size popular matching, i.e., M is neither dominant
nor stable. Thus we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 9. The graph G admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant if and
only if G admits a popular matching that matches all nodes except z and z′.
4.4 Desired popular matchings in G
We will call a matching M in G that matches all nodes except z and z′ a desired popular matching
here. Let M be such a matching and let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M , where n is the number of
nodes in G.
Recall Definition 5 from Section 2. We say a gadget is in unit (similarly, zero) state in α if for
any node u in this gadget, we have αu ∈ {±1} (resp., αu = 0). The following two observations will
be important here.
1. All level 3 gadgets have to be in unit state in α.
2. All level 0 gadgets have to be in zero state in α.
The nodes sc0 and t
c
0, for all clauses c, are left unmatched in any stable matching in G. Since M
has to match the unstable nodes sc0 and t
c
0 for all clauses c, αsc0 = αtc0 = −1 for all c (by Lemma 2).
Thus the first observation follows from Lemmas 3 and 6. We prove the second observation below.
Claim 1 Any level 0 gadget has to be in zero state in α.
Proof. Consider any level 0 gadget, say on nodes ac1, b
c
1, a
c
2, b
c
2. Since M is a popular matching, we
have αac1 + αz ≥ wtM (ac1, z) and αz′ + αbc1 ≥ wtM (z′, bc1). Since z and z′ are unmatched in M ,
αz = αz′ = 0 (by Lemma 2). Since wtM (a
c
1, z) = 0 and wtM (z
′, bc1) = 0, we have αac1 ≥ 0 and
αbc1 ≥ 0.
The edge (ac1, b
c
1) is a popular edge. Thus αac1 + αbc1 = wtM (a
c
1, b
c
1) (by Lemma 2) and we have
wtM (a
c
1, b
c
1) = 0 (as seen in the last part of the proof of Lemma 8). Thus αac1 + αbc1 = 0. So
αac1 = αbc1 = 0. Thus this gadget is in zero state and this holds for every level 0 gadget. ♦
Lemmas 9-11 are easy to show and are crucial to our NP-hardness proof. Let c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk
be any clause in φ. In our proofs below, we are omitting the superscript c from node names for the
sake of readability. Recall that α ∈ {0,±1}n is a witness of our “desired popular matching” M .
Lemma 9. For every clause c in φ, at least two of the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to c have
to be in unit state in α.
Proof. Let c be any clause in φ. We know from observation 1 above that the level 3 gadget corre-
sponding to c is in unit state in α. So αs0 = αt0 = −1. Also, one of the following three cases holds:
(1) (sc0, t
c
1) and (s
c
1, t
c
0) are in M , (2) (s
c
0, t
c
2) and (s
c
2, t
c
0) are in M , (3) (s
c
0, t
c
3) and (s
c
3, t
c
0) are in M .
– In case (1), the node t0 prefers p4 and p7 to its partner s1 in M . Thus wtM (p4, t0) = wtM (p7, t0) =
0. Since αt0 = −1, we need to have αp4 = αp7 = 1 so that αp4 + αt0 ≥ wtM (p4, t0) and
αp7 + αt0 ≥ wtM (p7, t0). Thus the middle and rightmost level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see
Fig. 3) have to be in unit state in α.
– In case (2), the node t0 prefers p7 to its partner s2 in M and the node s0 prefers q0 to its partner
t2 in M . Thus αp7 = αq0 = 1 so that αp7 + αt0 ≥ wtM (p7, t0) and αs0 + αq0 ≥ wtM (s0, q0).
Thus the leftmost and rightmost level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3) have to be in
unit state in α.
– In case (3), the node s0 prefers q0 and q3 to its partner t3 in M . Thus αq0 = αq3 = 1 so that
αs0 + αq0 ≥ wtM (s0, q0) and αs0 + αq3 ≥ wtM (s0, q3). Thus the leftmost and middle level 2
gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3) have to be in unit state in α. uunionsq
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Lemma 10. For any clause c in φ, at least one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in
c is in unit state in α.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 9 that at least two of the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to c are
in unit state in α. We have three cases here (see Fig. 3): (i) the leftmost and middle gadgets are in
unit state in α, (ii) the leftmost and rightmost gadgets are in unit state in α, and (iii) the middle
and rightmost gadgets are in unit state in α.
Let us consider case (i) first. It follows from the proof of Lemma 9 that αq0 = αq3 = 1. This
also forces αp1 = αp4 = 1. This is because αp1 and αp4 have to be non-negative since p1 and p4 are
neighbors of the unmatched node z. And so by Lemma 3, αp1 = 1 and αp4 = 1.
As q0 and p1 are the most preferred neighbors of p2 and q2 while p2 and q2 are the least preferred
neighbors of q0 and p1 in M (by Theorem 8), we have wtM (p2, q0) = wtM (p1, q2) = 0. Since (p2, q0)
and (p1, q2) are popular edges, it follows from Lemma 2 that αp2 +αq0 = 0 and αp1 +αq2 = 0. Thus
αp2 = αq2 = −1 and so (p2, q2) /∈M . So either (p2, q0), (p0, q2) are in M or (p2, q1), (p1, q2) are in M
(by Theorem 8). This means that either wtM (p2, yj) = 0 or wtM (xk, q2) = 0. That is, either αyj = 1
or αxk = 1.
Similarly, wtM (p5, q3) = wtM (p4, q5) = 0 and we can conclude that αp5 = αq5 = −1. Thus
(p5, q5) /∈M and either (p5, q3), (p3, q5) are in M or (p5, q4), (p4, q5) are in M (by Theorem 8). This
means that either wtM (p5, yk) = 0 or wtM (xi, q5) = 0. That is, either αyk = 1 or αxi = 1. Thus
either (1) the gadgets corresponding to variables Xi and Xj are in unit state or (2) the gadget
corresponding to Xk is in unit state in α. Thus in this case at least one of the level 1 gadgets
corresponding to variables in c is in unit state in α.
The proofs of case (ii) and case (iii) are quite similar. Let us consider case (ii) next. It follows
from the proof of Lemma 9 that αq0 = αp7 = 1. This also forces αp1 = αq6 = 1 and αp2 = αq2 = −1.
By the same reasoning as in case (i), we have either wtM (p2, yj) = 0 or wtM (xk, q2) = 0. That is,
either αyj = 1 or αxk = 1. Similarly, αp8 = αq8 = −1 and either wtM (p8, yi) = 0 or wtM (xj , q8) = 0,
i.e., αyi = 1 or αxj = 1.
So either (1) the gadgets corresponding to variables Xi and Xk are in unit state or (2) the gadget
corresponding to Xj is in unit state in α. Thus in this case also at least one of the level 1 gadgets
corresponding to variables in c is in unit state in α.
In case (iii), it follows from the proof of Lemma 9 that αp4 = αp7 = 1. This forces αq3 = αq6 = 1
and αp5 = αq5 = −1. By the same reasoning as in case (i), we have either wtM (p5, yk) = 0 or
wtM (xi, q5) = 0. That is, either αyk = 1 or αxi = 1. Similarly, either αyi = 1 or αxj = 1. Thus
either (1) the gadgets corresponding to variables Xj and Xk are in unit state or (2) the gadget
corresponding to Xi is in unit state in α. Thus in this case also at least one of the level 1 gadgets
corresponding to variables in c is in unit state in α. uunionsq
Lemma 11. For any clause c in φ, at most one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in
c is in unit state in α.
Proof. We know from observation 2 made at the start of this section that all the three level 0 gadgets
corresponding to c are in zero state in α. So αat = αbt = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 6. We know from Theorem 8
that either (a1, b1), (a2, b2) are in M or (a1, b2), (a2, b1) are in M . So either wtM (a1, y
′
j) = 0 or
wtM (x
′
k, b1) = 0. So either αy′j ≥ 0 or αx′k ≥ 0.
Consider any variable Xr. We know from Theorem 8 that either {(xr, y′r), (x′r, yr)} ⊆ M or
{(xr, yr), (x′r, y′r)} ⊆M . It follows from Lemma 2 that αxr +αy′r = wtM (xr, y′r) = 0 and αx′r +αyr =
wtM (x
′
r, yr) = 0. Also due to the nodes z and z
′, we have αxr ≥ 0 and αyr ≥ 0. Thus αy′r ≤ 0 and
αx′r ≤ 0.
Hence we can conclude that either αy′j = 0 or αx′k = 0. In other words, either the gadget
corresponding to Xj or the gadget corresponding to Xk is in zero state. Similarly, by analyzing the
level 0 gadget on nodes act , b
c
t for t = 3, 4, we can show that either the gadget corresponding to Xk
or the gadget corresponding to Xi is in zero state. Also, by analyzing the level 0 gadget on nodes
act , b
c
t for t = 5, 6, either the gadget corresponding to Xi or the gadget corresponding to Xj is in zero
state.
Thus at least 2 of the 3 gadgets corresponding to variables in clause c are in zero state in α.
Hence at most 1 of the 3 gadgets corresponding to variables in c is in unit state in α. uunionsq
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Theorem 10. If G admits a desired popular matching then φ has a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment.
Proof. Let M be a desired popular matching in G. That is, M matches all nodes except z and z′.
Let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M .
We will now define a true/false assignment for the variables in φ. For each variable Xr in φ do:
– If the level 1 gadget corresponding to Xr is in unit state in α, i.e., if αxr = αyr = 1 and
αx′r = αy′r = −1 or equivalently, if (xr, y′r) and (x′r, yr) are in M , then set Xr to true.
– Else setXr to false, i.e., the level 1 gadget corresponding toXr is in zero state inα or equivalently,
(xr, yr) and (x
′
r, y
′
r) are in M .
Since M is our desired popular matching, it follows from Lemmas 10 and 11 that for every clause
c in φ, exactly one of the three level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in c is in unit state in α.
When the gadget Xr is in unit state, we have αxr = αyr = 1 and αx′r = αy′r = −1. This is due to
the fact that αxr ≥ 0 and αyr ≥ 0 due to the nodes z and z′, respectively.
Thus Xr is in unit state in α if and only if the edges (xr, y
′
r) and (x
′
r, yr) are in M . Hence for
each clause c in φ, exactly one of the variables in c is set to true. Hence this is a 1-in-3 satisfying
assignment for φ. uunionsq
4.5 The converse
Suppose φ admits a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment. We will now use this assignment to construct a
desired popular matching M in G. The edge (a0, b0) is in M . For each variable Xr in φ do:
– if Xr = true then include the edges (xr, y
′
r) and (x
′
r, yr) in M ;
– else include the edges (xr, yr) and (x
′
r, y
′
r) in M .
Consider a clause c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk. We know that exactly one of Xi, Xj , Xk is set to true in our
assignment. Assume without loss of generality that Xj = true. We will include the following edges
in M from all the gadgets corresponding to c. Corresponding to the level 0 gadgets for c (see Fig. 2):
– Add the edges (ac1, b
c
1), (a
c
2, b
c
2) from the leftmost gadget and (a
c
5, b
c
6), (a
c
6, b
c
5) from the rightmost
gadget to M .
We will select (ac3, b
c
3), (a
c
4, b
c
4) from the middle gadget. (Note that we could also have selected
(ac3, b
c
4), (a
c
4, b
c
3) from the middle gadget.)
Corresponding to the level 2 gadgets for c (see Fig. 3):
– Add the edges (pc0, q
c
0), (p
c
2, q
c
1), (p
c
1, q
c
2) from the leftmost gadget, (p
c
3, q
c
3), (p
c
4, q
c
4), (p
c
5, q
c
5) from
the middle gadget, and (pc6, q
c
8), (p
c
7, q
c
7), (p
c
8, q
c
6) from the rightmost gadget to M .
Since the leftmost and rightmost level 2 gadgets (see Fig. 3) are dominant, we will include (sc0, t
c
2)
and (sc2, t
c
0) in M . Hence
– Add the edges (sc0, t
c
2), (s
c
1, t
c
1), (s
c
2, t
c
0), (s
c
3, t
c
3) to M .
Thus M matches all nodes except z and z′. We will show the following theorem now.
Theorem 11. The matching M described above is a popular matching in G.
Proof. We will prove M ’s popularity by describing a witness α ∈ {0,±1}n. That is,∑u∈A∪B αu will
be 0 and every edge will be covered by the sum of α-values of its endpoints, i.e., αu+αv ≥ wtM (u, v)
for all edges (u, v) in E. We will also have αu ≥ wtM (u, u) for all nodes u.
Set αa0 = αb0 = αz = αz′ = 0. Also set αu = 0 for all nodes u in the gadgets with no “blocking
edges”. This includes all level 0 gadgets, and the gadgets in level 1 that correspond to variables set
to false, and also the level 2 gadgets such as the gadget with nodes pc3, q
c
3, p
c
4, q
c
4, p
c
5, q
c
5 (the middle
gadget in Fig. 3) since we assumed Xj = true.
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For every variable Xr assigned to true: set αxr = αyr = 1 and αx′r = αy′r = −1. For every clause,
consider the level 2 gadgets corresponding to this clause with “blocking edges”: for our clause c,
these are the leftmost and rightmost gadgets in Fig. 3 (since we assumed Xj = true).
Recall that we included in M the edges (pc0, q
c
0), (p
c
2, q
c
1), (p
c
1, q
c
2) from the leftmost gadget. We
will set αqc0 = αpc1 = αqc1 = 1 and αpc0 = αpc2 = αqc2 = −1. We also included in M the edges
(pc6, q
c
8), (p
c
7, q
c
7), (p
c
8, q
c
6) from the rightmost gadget. We will set αpc6 = αqc6 = αpc7 = 1 and αqc7 =
αpc8 = αqc8 = −1.
In the level 3 gadget corresponding to c, we included in M the edges (sc0, t
c
2), (s
c
1, t
c
1), (s
c
2, t
c
0),
(sc3, t
c
3). We will set αtc1 = αsc2 = αtc2 = αsc3 = 1 and αsc0 = αtc0 = αsc1 = αtc3 = −1.
The claim below shows that α is indeed a valid witness for M . Thus M is a popular matching. uunionsq
Claim 2 The vector α defined above is a witness to M ’s popularity.
Proof. For any edge (u, v) ∈ M , we have αu + αv = 0, also αz = αz′ = 0. Thus
∑
u∈A∪B αu = 0.
For any neighbor v of z or z′, we have αv ≥ 0. Thus all edges incident to z or z′ are covered by the
sum of α-values of their endpoints. It is also easy to see that for every intra-gadget edge (u, v), we
have αu + αv ≥ wtM (u, v).
In particular, the endpoints of every blocking edge to M have their α-value set to 1. When
Xj = true, the edge (xj , yj) is a blocking edge to M and so are (p
c
1, q
c
1), (p
c
6, q
c
6), (s
c
2, t
c
2) in the
gadgets involving clause c. We will now check that the edge covering constraint holds for all edges
(u, v) where u and v belong to different levels.
– Consider edges in G between a level 0 gadget and a level 1 gadget. When Xj = true, the edges
(ac1, y
′
j) and (x
′
j , b
c
5) are the most interesting as they have one endpoint in a gadget with α-values
0 and another endpoint in a gadget with α-values equal to ±1.
Observe that both these edges are labeled (−,−). This is because ac1 prefers its partner bc1 to y′j
and symmetrically, y′j prefers its partner xj to a
c
1. Thus wtM (a
c
1, y
′
j) = −2 < αac1 + αy′j = 0− 1.
Similarly, bc5 prefers its partner a
c
6 to x
′
j and symmetrically, x
′
j prefers its partner yj to b
c
5. Thus
wtM (x
′
j , b
c
5) = −2 < αx′j + αbc5 = −1 + 0.
– We will now consider edges in G between a level 1 gadget and a level 2 gadget. We have
wtM (p
c
2, yj) = 0 since p
c
2 prefers yj to its partner q
c
1 while yj prefers its partner x
′
j to p
c
2.
We have αpc2 +αyj = −1 + 1 = wtM (pc2, yj) = 0. The edge (xk, qc2) is labeled (−,−) and we have
αxk = 0 and αq2 = −1.
Similarly, the edge (pc8, yi) is labeled (−,−) and so this is covered by the sum of α-values of its
endpoints. We have wtM (xj , q
c
8) = 0 = 1 − 1 = αxj + αqc8 . We also have wtM (pc5, yk) = 0 and
αpc5 = αyk = 0. Similarly, wtM (xi, q
c
5) = 0 and αxi = αqc5 = 0. Thus all these edges are covered.
– We will now consider edges in G between a level 2 gadget and a level 3 gadget. First, consider the
edges (sc0, q
c
0), (s
c
0, q
c
3), (p
c
7, t
c
0), (p
c
4, t
c
0). We have wtM (s
c
0, q
c
0) = 0 and αsc0 = −1, αqc0 = 1, so this
edge is covered. Similarly, wtM (p
c
7, t
c
0) = 0 and αpc7 = 1, αtc0 = −1. The edges (sc0, qc3) and (pc4, tc0)
are labeled (−,−), so they are also covered. Next consider the edges (sc0, qci3j+2) and (pci3j+2, tc0)
for any clause ci and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. It is easy to see that these edges are labeled (−,−), so these
edges are also covered.
– Finally consider the edges between a level 1 gadget and a level 3 gadget. Corresponding to clause
c, these edges are (sc0, y
′
i) and (x
′
i, t
c
0) for any i ∈ [n0]. It is again easy to see that these edges are
labeled (−,−) and so they are covered. Thus it follows that α is a witness to M ’s popularity. ♦
4.6 Proof of Theorem 8
Let c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk be a clause in φ. We will show in the following claims that no edge between 2
different gadgets can be popular.
Claim 3 No edge between a level 0 node and a level 1 node can be popular.
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Proof. Consider any such edge in G, say (ac1, y
′
j). In order to show this edge cannot be present
in any popular matching, we will show a popular matching S along with a witness α such that
αac1 +αy′j > wtS(a
c
1, y
′
j). Then it will immediately follow from the slackness of this edge that (a
c
1, y
′
j)
is not used in any popular matching (by Lemma 2).
Let S be the men-optimal stable matching in G. The vector α = 0 is a witness to S. The edges
(ac1, b
c
1) and (x
′
j , y
′
j) belong to S, so we have wt(a
c
1, y
′
j) = −2 while αac1 = αy′j = 0. Thus (ac1, y′j) is
not a popular edge. We can similarly show that (x′k, b
c
1) is not a popular edge by considering the
women-optimal stable matching S′. ♦
Claim 4 No edge between a level 1 node and a level 2 node is popular.
Proof. Consider any such edge in G, say (pc2, yj). Consider the dominant matching M
∗ that contains
the edges (pc0, q
c
2), (p
c
2, q
c
0) and also (xj , y
′
j), (x
′
j , yj). Note that wtM∗(p
c
2, yj) = −2.
A witness β to M∗ sets βpc2 = βqc2 = −1 and βxj = βyj = 1. This is because (xj , yj) and (pc0, qc0)
are blocking edges to M∗, so βxj = βyj = 1 and similarly, βpc0 = βqc0 = 1 (this makes βpc2 = βqc2 = −1).
So βpc2 + βyj = 0 while wtM∗(p
c
2, yj) = −2. Thus this edge is slack and so it cannot be a popular
edge.
We can similarly show that the edge (xk, q
c
2) is not popular by considering the dominant matching
that includes the edges (pc1, q
c
2) and (p
c
2, q
c
1). ♦
Claim 5 No edge between a node in level 3 and a node in levels 1 or 2 is popular.
Proof. Consider the edge (sc0, q
c
0). The dominant matching M
∗ includes the edges (sc0, t
c
1), (s
c
1, t
c
0),
and (pc2, q
c
0). So we have wtM∗(s
c
0, q
c
0) = −2 while βsc0 = −1 and βqc0 = 1, where β is a wit-
ness to M∗. Hence (sc0, q
c
0) is not a popular edge. It can similarly be shown for any edge e ∈
{(sc0, qc3), (pc4, tc0), (pc7, tc0)} that e is not a popular edge.
Suppose the edge (sc0, u) for some u ∈ {y′i : i ∈ [n0]} ∪ {qci2 , qci5 , qci8 : ci is a clause} belongs
to a popular matching M . In order to show a contradiction, consider the edge (sc0, t
c
1). We have
wtM (s
c
0, t
c
1) = 0 since s
c
0 prefers t
c
1 to u while t
c
1 prefers its partner in M (this is s
c
1) to s
c
0. Since
αsc0 = −1, it has to be the case that αtc1 = 1.
Since sc0 is matched to a node outside {tc1, tc2, tc3}, the node tc0 also has to be matched to a node
outside {sc1, sc2, sc3} — otherwise one of the 3 stable nodes tc1, tc2, tc3 would be left unmatched in M ;
however as M is popular, every stable node has to be matched in M . We have also seen earlier that
neither (pc4, t
c
0) nor (p
c
7, t
c
0) is popular. Thus t
c
0 has to be matched to a neighbor worse than s
c
1.
Thus wtM (s
c
1, t
c
0) = 0 and so αsc1 = 1. Since (s
c
1, t
c
1) is a stable edge, it follows from Lemma 2
that αsc1 + αtc1 = wtM (s
c
1, t
c
1). However wtM (s
c
1, t
c
1) = 0 since (s
c
1, t
c
1) ∈ M and we have just shown
that αsc1 = αtc1 = 1. This is a contradiction and thus (s
c
0, u) /∈M . ♦
It is easy to see that the nodes z and z′ are in the same connected component of FG as the
dominant matching M∗ contains the edges (a0, z) and (z′, b0) while any stable matching in G contains
(a0, b0). We will now show that any popular matching that matches z and z
′ has to match these
nodes to a0 and b0, respectively.
Lemma 12. If M is a popular matching in M that matches z and z′ then {(a0, z), (z′, b0)} ⊆M .
Proof. Suppose (xi, z) ∈ M for some i ∈ [n0]. We know from the above claims that there is no
popular edge between xi’s gadget and any neighbor in levels 0, 2, or 3. So (xi, z) ∈ M implies
that (z′, yi) ∈ M since all the 4 nodes xi, yi, x′i, y′i have to be matched in M and there is no other
possibility of a popular edge incident to either yi or y
′
i. Hence (x
′
i, y
′
i) ∈M . Thus (xi, y′i) and (x′i, yi)
are blocking edges to M .
This means that αxi = αyi = αx′i = αy′i = 1. Note that (x
′
i, y
′
i) is a stable edge and so αx′i +αy′i =
wtM (x
′
i, y
′
i). However wtM (x
′
i, y
′
i) = 0 while αx′i = αy′i = 1. This is a contradiction and hence
(xi, z) /∈ M for any i ∈ [n0]. We can similarly show that neither (pc3j+1, z) nor (z′, qc3j) is in M , for
any j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and any clause c.
So if z and z′ are matched in M then it has to be either with a0, b0 or with some level 0 neighbors.
Observe that if (ac2i−1, z) ∈ M then (z′, bc2i−1) ∈ M as the 4 nodes ac2i−1, bc2i−1, ac2i, bc2i have to be
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matched in M and there is no other possibility of a popular edge incident to any of these 4 nodes
(by our first claim in this section).
Suppose (ac2i−1, z) and (z
′, bc2i−1) are in M for some c and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Since z prefers a0 to any
level 0 neighbor, we have wtM (a0, z) = 0. Similarly, wtM (z
′, b0) = 0. Since wtM (ac2i−1, b
c
2i−1) = 2,
this implies that αac2i−1 = αbc2i−1 = 1. Hence, αz = αz′ = −1 and we have αa0 = αb0 = 1. Note that
αa0 + αb0 has to be equal to wtM (a0, b0) as (a0, b0) is a popular edge.
If a0 is not matched to z (and so b0 is not matched to z
′), then (a0, b0) ∈M . So wtM (a0, b0) = 0,
however αa0 +αb0 = 2, a contradiction. Thus if M matches z and z
′ then {(a0, z), (z′, b0)} ⊆M . uunionsq
Thus the above claims and Lemma 12 show that every level i gadget (for i = 0, 1, 2, 3) forms a
distinct connected component in the graph FG and the 4 nodes a0, b0, z, and z
′ belong to their own
connected component. This finishes the proof of Theorem 8.
We have shown a polynomial time reduction from 1-in-3 SAT to the problem of deciding if
G = (A∪B,E) admits a popular matching that matches all nodes except z and z′. That is, we have
shown the following theorem.
Theorem 12. The instance G = (A ∪ B,E) admits a popular matching that matches all nodes
except z and z′ if and only if φ is in 1-in-3 SAT.
Theorem 9 showed that G admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant if and
only if G admits a popular matching that matches all nodes except z and z′. Hence Theorem 7
follows from Theorem 12.
5 Related hardness results
5.1 Popular matchings with forced/forbidden elements
We now consider the popular matching problem in G = (A ∪ B,E) with forced/forbidden elements
(pmffe), which is the variant of the popular matching problem in a bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E),
where our input also consists of some forced (resp., forbidden) edges E1 (resp., E0), and/or some
forced (resp. forbidden) nodes U1 (resp. U0). The goal is to compute a popular matching M in
G where all forced elements are included in M and no forbidden element is included in M . The
following result is immediate.
Corollary 1. The popular matching problem in G = (A∪B,E) with a given forced node set U1 and
a given forbidden node set U0 is NP-hard for |U0| = |U1| = 1.
The proof of Corollary 1 follows from our instance G in Section 4 with U0 = {z} and U1 = {sc0}.
It follows from the proof of Lemma 8 that the nodes sc0, t
c
0 for all clauses c have to be matched in
such a popular matching M . So M has to match all nodes in G except z and z′. Theorem 12 showed
that finding such a popular matching M is NP-hard.
The variant of the popular matching problem in G = (A∪B,E) with a given forced node set U1
where |U1| = 1 and a given forced/forbidden edge set E0 ∪E1 where |E0 ∪E1| = 1 is also NP-hard.
To show this, consider U1 = {sc0} and either E1 = {(a0, b0)} or E0 = {(a0, z)}. The forced node set
forces the nodes sc0, t
c
0 for all clauses c to be matched in our popular matching M while E1 (similarly,
E0) forces z and z
′ to be unmatched in M .
In order to show the NP-hardness of the variant with |E0| = 2 or |E1| = 2, we will augment our
instance G in Section 4 with an extra level 1 gadget X0 (see Fig. 1). Call the new instance G0. The
gadget X0 has 4 nodes x0, x
′
0, y0, y
′
0 with the following preferences:
x0 : y0  y′0 y0 : x0  x′0
x′0 : y0  y′0  tc10  · · ·  tck0 y′0 : x0  x′0  sc10  · · ·  sck0
Thus nodes in the gadget X0 are not adjacent to z or z
′ or to any node in levels 0, 1, or 2 —
however x′0 is adjacent to t
c
0 for all clauses c and y
′
0 is adjacent to s
c
0 for all clauses c. For each
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clause c, the node y′0 is at the bottom of s
c
0’s preference list and the node x
′
0 is at the bottom of t
c
0’s
preference list.
A stable matching in the instance G0 includes the edges (x0, y0) and (x
′
0, y
′
0) while there is
a dominant matching in this instance with the edges (x0, y
′
0) and (x
′
0, y0). It is easy to extend
Theorem 8 to show that the popular subgraph for the instance G0 is the popular subgraph FG
along with an extra connected component with 4 nodes x0, y0, x
′
0, y
′
0. We are now ready to show the
following result.
Lemma 13. The popular matching problem in G = (A ∪ B,E) with a given forced edge set E1 is
NP-hard for |E1| = 2.
The proof of Lemma 13 follows from the instance G0 with E1 = {(a0, b0), (x0, y′0)}. Let M be a
popular matching in G0 that includes the edges (a0, b0) and (x0, y
′
0). Since M has to contain (a0, b0),
it means that the nodes z and z′ are unmatched in M .
Since (x0, y
′
0) ∈M , it means that (x′0, y0) ∈M . So (x0, y0) is a blocking edge to M and we have
αx0 = αy0 = 1 and αx′0 = αy′0 = −1. This forces sc0, tc0 for all c to be matched in M . The argument
is the same as in Lemma 8 since the edges (sc0, y
′
0) and (x
′
0, t
c
0) would not be covered otherwise. This
is because αx′0 = αy′0 = −1 and if sc0, tc0 are unmatched then αsc0 = αtc0 = 0 and wtM (sc0, y′0) =
wtM (x
′
0, t
c
0) = 0. This would make αsc0 + αy′0 < wtM (s
c
0, y
′
0) and similarly, αx′0 + αtc0 < wtM (x
′
0, t
c
0).
Thus M has to be a popular matching that matches all nodes in G0 except z and z
′. It is easy
to see that the proof of Theorem 12 implies that finding such a popular matching in G0 is NP-hard.
We can similarly show that the popular matching problem in G0 with a given forbidden edge
set E0 is NP-hard for |E0| = 2. For this, we will take E0 = {(a0, z), (x0, y0)}. This is equivalent to
setting E1 = {(a0, b0), (x0, y′0)}.
We can similarly show that this problem with a given forced set E1 and a given forbidden edge
set E0 is NP-hard for |E0| = |E1| = 1. For this, we will take E0 = {(a0, z)} and E1 = {(x0, y′0)}.
This will force sc0, t
c
0 for all c to be matched in M while z, z
′ are unmatched in M .
Finally, the variant with |U0| = 1 and |E0 ∪ E1| = 1 follows by taking U0 = {z} and E0 =
{(x0, y0)} or E1 = {(x0, y′0)}.
We now put all those observations together in the following theorem.
Theorem 13. The popular matching problem in G = (A ∪B,E) with forced/forbidden element set
〈E0, E1, U0, U1〉 is NP-hard when (i) |E0| = 2, (ii) |E1| = 2, (iii) |E0| = |E1| = 1, (iv) |U0| = |U1| =
1, (v) |U0| = 1 and |E0 ∪ E1| = 1, and (vi) |U1| = 1 and |E0 ∪ E1| = 1.
Note that when |E1| = 1 and E0 = U0 = U1 = ∅, pmffe reduces to the popular edge problem,
that can be solved in polynomial time [7]. Now suppose |E0| = 1 and E1 = U0 = U1 = ∅: we show
below that a polynomial-time algorithm for pmffe follows from the algorithm for the popular edge
problem. Define Es and Es as:
Es = {e ∈ E : ∃ stable matching M s.t. e ∈M},
Es = {e ∈ E : ∃ stable matching M s.t. e /∈M}.
Ed, Ed (resp., Ep, Ep) are defined similarly, by replacing “stable” with “dominant” (resp., popular).
It was proved in [7] that Ep = Es ∪ Ed. We now argue that Ep = Es ∪ Ed.
Consider any e ∈ Es ∪ Ed. Since there is a stable or dominant matching that does not contain
e, it follows that e ∈ Ep. We conclude that Ep ⊇ Es ∪ Ed. We will now show that Ep ⊆ Es ∪ Ed.
Consider any e = (i, j) ∈ Ep. There is a popular matching M s.t. e /∈ M , and i or j is matched
(if i and j are unmatched then (i, j) = (+,+), and M is not popular). Without loss of generality
assume (j, k) ∈ M . It follows from Ep = Es ∪ Ed that there exists a stable or dominant matching
M ′ s.t. (j, k) ∈M ′, hence (i, j) /∈M ′. Thus Ep ⊆ Es ∪ Ed.
Since Ep = Es ∪ Ed, we can solve the forbidden edge problem by checking if e ∈ Es or e ∈ Ed.
For stable matchings, this can be done in polynomial time, see e.g. [13]. For dominant matchings, it
immediately follows from results from [7].
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5.2 Weighted popular matching problems
In this section, we are given, together with the usual bipartite graph and the rankings, a nonnegative
edge weight vector c ≥ 0. First, consider the problem of finding a popular matching of minimum
weight wrt c (min-wp). Recall that pmffe with |E0| = 2, U1 = U0 = E1 = ∅ is NP-hard, as shown by
the instance with graph G0 and E0 = {(a0, z), (x0, y0)} (see Section 5.1). Let the weights of (a0, z)
and (x0, y0) be equal to 1, and let all other weights be 0. We can conclude the following.
Corollary 2. min-wp is NP-Hard.
Now consider the problem of finding a popular matching of maximum weight wrt c. We denote
this problem by max-wp. It was shown in [20] that this problem is NP-hard. We show here a tight
inapproximability result.
Theorem 14. Unless P=NP, max-wp cannot be approximated in polynomial time to a factor better
than 12 . On the other hand, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a
1
2 -approximation
to max-wp.
Proof. Consider the instance G0 again. The hardness of approximating max-wp to a factor better
than 12 immediately follows from Lemma 13 by setting the weights of edges (a0, b0) and (x0, y
′
0) to
1 and all other edge weights to 0.
We will now show that a popular matching in G of weight at least c(M∗)/2 can be computed in
polynomial time, where M∗ is a max-weight popular matching in G. It was shown in [7] that any
popular matching M in G = (A ∪ B,E) can be partitioned into M0 ∪M1 such that M0 ⊆ S and
M1 ⊆ D, where S is a stable matching and D is a dominant matching in G.
Consider the following algorithm.
1. Compute a max-weight stable matching S∗ in G.
2. Compute a max-weight dominant matching D∗ in G.
3. Return the matching in {S∗, D∗} with larger weight.
Since all edge weights are non-negative, either the max-weight stable matching in G or the
max-weight dominant matching in G has weight at least c(M∗)/2. Thus Steps 1-3 compute a 12 -
approximation for max-weight popular matching in G = (A ∪B,E).
Regarding the implementation of this algorithm, both S∗ and D∗ can be computed in polynomial
time [24, 7]. Thus our algorithm runs in polynomial time. uunionsq
5.3 Popular and Dominant matchings in non-bipartite graphs
In this section, we consider the popular (similarly, dominant) problem in general graphs. The only
modification to the input with respect to the previous paragraphs, is that our input graph G is not
required to be bipartite. As usual, together with G, we are given a collection of rankings, one per
node of G, with each node ranking its neighbors in a strict order of preference. The goal is to decide
if G admits a popular (resp., dominant) matching.
Theorem 12 showed that that the problem of deciding if a bipartite instance G = (A ∪ B,E)
admits a popular matching that matches exclusively a given set S ⊂ A ∪ B is NP-hard (i.e., the
nodes outside S have to be left unmatched). Let us call this the exclusive popular set problem. We
will now use the hardness of the exclusive popular set problem in the instance G from Section 4 to
show that the dominant problem in non-bipartite graphs is NP-hard. In order to show this, merge
the nodes z and z′ in the instance G from Section 4 into a single node z. Call the new graph G′.
The preference list of the node z in G′ is all its level 1 neighbors in some order of preference,
followed by all its level 2 neighbors in some order of preference, followed by a0, b0, and then level 0
neighbors. The order among level i neighbors (for i = 0, 1, 2) in this list does not matter.
Lemma 14. A popular matching N in G′ is dominant if and only N matches all nodes in G′ except
z.
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Proof. Let N be any popular matching in G′. Any popular matching has to match all stable nodes
in G′ [14], thus N matches all stable nodes in G′. Suppose some unstable node other than z (say,
sc0) is left unmatched in N . We claim that t
c
0 also has to be left unmatched in N . Since s
c
1 and t
c
1
have no other neighbors, the edge (sc1, t
c
1) ∈ N and so there is an augmenting path ρ = sc0-tc1-sc1-tc0
with respect to N . Observe that N is not more popular than N ⊕ ρ, a larger matching. Thus N is
not a dominant matching in G′.
In order to justify that tc0 also has to be left unmatched in N , let us view N as a popular matching
in G. We know that sc0 and t
c
0 belong to the same connected component in the popular subgraph FG
(by Lemma 6). So if sc0 is left unmatched in N , then t
c
0 is also unmatched in N (by Lemma 3).
Conversely, suppose N is a popular matching in G′ that matches all nodes except z. Then there
is no larger matching than N in G′, thus N is a dominant matching in G′. uunionsq
Thus a dominant matching exists in G′ if and only if there is a popular matching in G′ that
matches all nodes except z. This is equivalent to deciding if there exists a popular matching in G
that matches all nodes in G except z and z′. Thus we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 15. Given a graph G = (V,E) with strict preference lists, the problem of deciding if G
admits a dominant matching or not is NP-hard. Moreover, this hardness holds even when G admits
a stable matching.
We will now show that the popular matching problem in non-bipartite graphs is also NP-hard.
For this, we will augment the graph G′ with the gadget D given in Fig. 4. Call the new graph H.
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Fig. 4. Each of d1, d2, d3 is a top choice neighbor for another node here and d0 is the last choice of d1, d2, d3.
The gadget D. There will be 4 nodes d0, d1, d2, d3 that form the gadget D (see Fig. 4). The preferences
of nodes in D are given below.
d1 : d2  d3  d0 d2 : d3  d1  d0
d3 : d1  d2  d0 d0 : d1  d2  d3  · · ·
The node d0 will be adjacent to all nodes in H, except z. The neighbors of d0 that are not in D
are in the “· · · ” part of d0’s preference list and the order among these nodes does not matter. The
node d0 will be at the bottom of preference lists of all its neighbors.
Lemma 15. For any popular matching M in H, the following properties hold:
(1) either {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} ⊂M or {(d0, d2), (d1, d3)} ⊂M .
(2) M matches all nodes in H except z.
Proof. Since each of d1, d2, d3 is a top choice neighbor for some node in H, a popular matching in
H cannot leave any of these 3 nodes unmatched. Since these 3 nodes have no neighbors outside
themselves other than d0, a popular matching has to match d0 to one of d1, d2, d3. Thus d0, d1, d2, d3
are matched among themselves in M .
The only possibilities for M when restricted to d0, d1, d2, d3 are the pair of edges (d0, d1), (d2, d3)
and (d0, d2), (d1, d3). The third possibility (d0, d3), (d1, d2) is “less popular than” (d0, d1), (d2, d3) as
d0, d2, and d3 prefer the latter to the former. This proves part (1) of the lemma.
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Consider any node v 6= z outside the gadget D. If v is left unmatched in M then we either have
an alternating path ρ1 = (v, d0)-(d0, d1)-(d1, d3) or an alternating path ρ2 = (v, d0)-(d0, d2)-(d2, d1)
with respect to M : the middle edge in each of these alternating paths belongs to M and the third
edge is a blocking edge with respect to M . Both ρ1 and ρ2 are M -alternating paths in GM that start
from an M -exposed node and end with a (+,+) edge — this is a forbidden structure for a popular
matching (see Theorem 1, path (iii)). Hence every node v 6= z in H has to be matched in M . This
proves part (2). uunionsq
Since the total number of nodes in H is odd, at least 1 node has to be left unmatched in any
matching in H. Lemma 15 shows that the node z will be left unmatched in any popular matching
in H. For any popular matching M in H, the matching M restricted to G′ (recall that G′ is H \D)
has to be popular on G′, otherwise it would contradict the popularity of M in H. We will now show
the following converse of Lemma 15.
Lemma 16. If G′ admits a popular matching that matches all its nodes except z then H admits a
popular matching.
Proof. Let N be a popular matching in G′ that matches all its nodes except z. Let G′N be the
subgraph obtained by removing all edges labeled (−,−) with respect to N from G′. Since N is
popular in G′, it satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for popularity given in Theorem 1.
We claim M = N ∪ {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} is a popular matching in H. We will now show that M
obeys those conditions in the subgraph HM obtained by deleting edges labeled (−,−) with respect
to M . The graph HM is the graph G
′
N along with some edges within the gadget D.
There is no edge in HM between D and any node in G
′ since every edge in H between D and a
node in G′ is (−,−). This is because for any such edge (d0, v), the node d0 prefers d1 (its partner
in M) to v and similarly, v prefers each of its neighbors in G′ to d0. Since v 6= z, we know that N
(and thus M) matches v to one of its neighbors in G′.
It is easy to check that {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} satisfies the 3 conditions from Theorem 1 in the
subgraph of D obtained by pruning (−,−) edges. We know that N satisfies the 3 conditions from
Theorem 1 in G′N . Thus M satisfies all these 3 conditions in HM . Hence M is popular in H. uunionsq
Thus we have shown that H admits a popular matching if and only if G′ admits a matching that
matches all nodes except z. Since the latter problem is NP-hard, so is the former problem. Thus we
have shown the following result.
Theorem 16. Given a graph G = (V,E) with strict preference lists, the problem of deciding if G
admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard.
6 Popular matchings of minimum cost in bounded treewidth graphs
In this section, we show a polynomial time algorithm to compute a minimum cost popular matching
in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with arbitrary edge costs under the assumption that G has
bounded treewidth.
Bounded treewidth is a classical assumption that often turns intractable problems into tractable
ones. A typical example is Maximum Independent (Stable) Set (MIS), for which a polynomial-time
algorithm exists in bounded treewidth graphs [3]. MIS enjoys two nice properties, often shared by
problems for which the bounded treewidth approach is successful. The first is monotonicity : if S is
an independent set in a graph G and G′ is a subgraph of G, then the solution induced by S on G′ is
also feasible. The second is locality : in order to check if S is an independent set, it suffices to verify,
for each node of S, if any node of its neighborhood also belongs to S.
Interestingly, similar properties do not hold for popular matchings. Indeed, popularity is not a
local condition, since it may depend on how nodes far away in the graph are matched. Moreover, if
we take a graph G and a popular matching M , the subset of M contained in an induced subgraph
of G may not be popular. Examples with both those features can be easily constructed by building
on the characterization of popular matchings given by Theorem 1.
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Our technique to prove the tractability of the minimum cost popular matching problem in the
bounded treewidth case is as follows. We assume wlog that all matchings have different costs. Given a
vertex separator S of G and a connected component X, we define the family of (S,X)-locally popular
matchings. This contains all matchings that may potentially be extended to a popular matching in
the whole graph by adding edges not incident to X∪S (a formal definition is given in Section 6.2). As
(S,X)-locally popular matchings can be exponentially many even in graphs of bounded treewidth,
we cannot store all of them. Instead, we divide them in classes (which we call tipping points), and
show that, if a matching M of a class can be completed to a (S′, X ′)-locally popular matching for
some sets with X ′ ⊇ X and X ′ ∪ S′ ⊇ X ∪ S by adding some matching M ′ not incident to X ∪ S,
then all matchings of the same class can be extended via the same matching M ′ to a (S′, X ′)-locally
popular matching. Hence, it is enough to keep only a representative for each class — the one of
minimum cost, which we call the leader. Finally, we show how to iteratively construct tipping points
and their leaders by building on a tree decomposition of the graph (see Algorithm 1). In particular,
if the graph has bounded treewidth, a tree decomposition of bounded width can be computed in
linear time [4], there will be only polynomially many tipping points and leaders, and they can be
built in polynomial time, see Theorem 17.
6.1 Additional definitions
For k ∈ N, we write [k] := {1, . . . , k}. Recall that our input graph is G = (V,E). For S ⊆ V , we
denote by G \ S the subgraph of G induced by V \ S. If G \ S is disconnected, S is said to be a
vertex separator. Given a matching M on G and a set U ⊆ V , the matching induced by M on U
is given by E[U ] ∩M , and it is denoted by M [U ]. For u ∈ V , M(u) is the unique v ∈ V such that
(u, v) ∈M if such a v exists, and ∅ otherwise.
Now also fix U ⊆ V . Given a matching M of G, we say that M is a U -matching if for all edges
(u, v) ∈M , we have {u, v}∩U 6= ∅. Given a matching M of G, the U -matching induced by M is the
set MU = {(u, v) ∈M : {u, v} ∩ U 6= ∅}.
Since all graphs we deal with are simple, throughout this section we represent paths and cycles
as ordered set of nodes, with the first node of a cycle coinciding with the last. This also allows us to
distinguish between the first and last node of a path. We will say that e is an edge of P if it is an
edge between two consecutive nodes of P . A U -path P is a path in G where either the first or the
last node of P (or possibly both) belongs to U , and all other vertices of P do not lie in U (i.e., if
P = (v1, . . . , vk), then ∅ 6= P ∩ U ⊆ {v1, vk}).
Two paths P = (v1, . . . , vk), P
′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
k′) are called U -disjoint if P ∩ P ′ ∩ U = ∅. P , P ′
are said to be internally vertex-disjoint if, for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [k′], vi 6= v′j with possibly the
exception of (i, j) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, k′), (k, 1), (k, k′)}. Consider paths P1, P2, . . . , Pq of G, q ≥ 2, whose
union contains at least two distinct vertices and with the following properties:
– Pi ∩ Pj = ∅, unless |i− j| ≤ 1 or i, j ∈ {1, q};
– If q ≥ 3, for i = 1, . . . , q − 1, the last node of Pi is the first node of Pi+1, and Pi, Pi+1 are
otherwise disjoint. Moreover, P1 and Pq are disjoint, with possibly the exception of the last node
of Pq coinciding with the first node of P1;
– If q = 2, the last node of P1 coincides with the first node of P2, the last node of P2 may coincide
with the first node of P1, and paths P1 and P2 are otherwise disjoint.
The juxtaposition of P1, . . . , Pq is the path (if the first node of P1 and the last of Pq are different) or
cycle (otherwise) defined from (P1, P2, . . . , Pq) as above by removing consecutive repeated vertices.
We assume that no two matchings of G have the same cost. This can be achieved efficiently by
standard perturbation techniques.
6.2 Locally popular matchings, Configurations, and Tipping points
In this section, we fix a graph G = (V,E) together with a strict ranking of the neighbors of each
node in V , a vertex separator S of G, and a connected component X of G \ S (possibly S = ∅ and
X = V ).
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Let M be a (X ∪ S)-matching of G. We will extensively work with graph GM [X ∪ S] – that is,
the subgraph of GM induced by X∪S. For a node v in S that is matched in M to a neighbor outside
X ∪ S, the labels of edges of GM [X ∪ S] incident to v are a function of the edge (v,M(v)), however
note that the edge (v,M(v)) is not in G[X ∪ S].
We say that M is (S,X)-locally popular if none of the structures (i), (ii), and (iii) from Theorem 1
is a subgraph of GM [X ∪S]. We remark that a node that is not matched in GM [X ∪S] may still be
M -covered (hence not M -exposed). If this happens, such a node cannot be the M -exposed node in
the path (iii) from Theorem 1. The following simple proposition relates the definitions of popularity
and (S,X)-local popularity.
Proposition 1 Let G,S,X be as above, S′ be a vertex separator of G, and X ′ be one of the connected
components of G \ S′ such that X ′ ∪ S′ ⊇ X ∪ S. Then:
1. Let M be a matching in G. Then M is (∅, V )-locally popular if and only if it is popular.
2. Let M ′ be a (S′, X ′)-locally popular matching. Let M := M ′X∪S. Then M is an (S,X)-locally
popular matching.
Proof. 1. It follows by definition and from the fact that GM [∅ ∪ V ] = GM .
2. Suppose M is not (S,X)-locally popular. Then, one of the structures from Theorem 1 is a
subgraph of GM [X∪S] — call it P . We claim that P is a forbidden structure in GM ′ [X ′∪S′] (again,
in the sense of Theorem 1), hence M ′ is not (S′, X ′)-locally popular, a contradiction.
Indeed, X ∪S ⊆ X ′ ∪S′, and none of the edges of M ′ \M is incident to X ∪S by definition. We
deduce GM [X ∪S] = GM ′ [X ∪S] and a node of X ∪S is M -exposed if and only if it is M ′-exposed.
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
We now introduce the concepts of configuration and tipping point in order to partition the family
of (S,X)-locally popular matchings into a (small) number of classes. These definitions are related
to the existence of certain structures that are not forbidden in a popular matching, but restrict the
capability of extending locally popular matchings to popular matchings of the whole graph.
From now on, we also fix M to be a (X ∪S)-matching of G. Let PM be the set of M -alternating
paths of GM [X ∪ S]. We associate to each P ∈ PM a 2-dimensional parity vector pi, where the first
component of pi is defined to be 0 if the first edge of P is a matching edge, 1 otherwise. Similarly,
the second component of the parity vector pi takes values 0 or 1, depending on whether the last
edge of the path is a matching edge or not. We also associate to P a two-dimensional level vector
` = (e, p), where e ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the number of M -exposed nodes of P , and p ∈ {0, 1} denotes the
number of (+,+) edges of P . If p ≥ 2, then we say that P is of level∞. Note that not all parity-level
combinations are possible. Moreover, if P is of level ∞, then M is not (S,X)-locally popular. Let
U = ((u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (uk, vk)), (1)
for some k ∈ N, where u1, v1, u2, . . . , vk ∈ S ∪ {∅}, under the additional condition that ui 6= vi for
all i ∈ [k], all pairs are different, and each node of S can appear at most twice in the collection.
Moreover, let L = (`1, . . . , `k), Π = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pik) and, for i ∈ [k], `i ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1} and
pii ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}. The triple C = (U,L,Π) is called an (S,X)-configuration.
We say that M is active at C if there exist pairwise X-disjoint S-paths P 1, . . . , P k ∈ PM , such
that, for i ∈ [k], P i: is of level `i and parity pii; starts at ui ∈ S if ui 6= ∅ and at some node of
X otherwise; ends at vi ∈ S if vi 6= ∅ and at some node of X otherwise. We call those paths the
certificate of C at M4.
Let {(Ui, Li, Πi)}i=1,...,q be the collection of all (S,X)-configurations at which M is active. We
call
({(Ui, Li, Πi)}i=1,...,q,MS)
the (S,X)-tipping point of M .
4 Note that, if M is active at C, it is also active at the configurations e.g. obtained by permuting entries of
U (and of L and Π accordingly). This causes some redundancy, yet this will not affect our analysis, so we
do not eliminate it.
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Proposition 2 Let G,X, S be as above. Let M be an (S,X)-locally popular matching. The (S,X)-
tipping point of M is uniquely defined. On the other hand, there exists a function g : N → N such
that the number of (S,X)-configurations is bounded by g(|S|), and the collection of (S,X)-tipping
points of M , where M ranges over all (S,X)-locally popular matchings, has size at most g(|S|)|V ||S|.
Proof. The first statement follows by definition. For the second and third: the number of (S,X)-
configurations (U,L,Π) is a function of the size of S only, since all pairs from U are different, and
each node of S can appear in at most two pairs from U . Moreover, the number of S-matchings of G
is upper bounded by |V ||S|. uunionsq
Proposition 3 Let G,X, S be as above. Let M be an (S,X)-locally popular matching and T be the
(S,X)-tipping point of M . Let N be another (S,X)-locally popular matching whose (S,X)-tipping
point is also T . Let e ∈ δ(v) for some v ∈ S. Then:
1. e ∈M if and only if e ∈ N .
2. Suppose e /∈ M and let ? ∈ {+,−} be the label of e at v wrt M . Then e /∈ N and ? is also the
label of e at v wrt N .
Proof. Both statements immediately follow from MS = NS , which holds by definition of tipping
point. uunionsq
6.3 Leaders
Fix G,S,X,M as in the previous section, and let T be the (S,X)-tipping point of M . M is said to
be the T -leader if it is the one of minimum cost among all (S,X)-locally popular matchings whose
(S,X)-tipping point is T . Due to the initial perturbation of costs, note that there is at most one
T -leader for each tipping point T .
The following crucial lemma shows that, in order to find a min cost popular matching, it suffices
to consider matchings that induce (X∪S)-matchings that are T -leaders, for any (S,X)-tipping point
T . The proof of Lemma 17 is given in Section 6.7.
Lemma 17. Suppose we are given G,X, S,M as above. Let T be the (S,X)-tipping point of M , and
assume that M is not the T -leader. Let S′ be a vertex separator of G, X ′ a connected component of
G \ S′ with the property that X ′ ⊇ X and S′ ∪X ′ ⊇ S ∪X (possibly S′ = ∅ and X ′ = V ). Let M ′
be a (S′, X ′)-locally popular matching such that M ′X∪S = M . Let T ′ be the (S′, X ′)-tipping point of
M ′. Then M ′ is not a T ′-leader.
6.4 Tree decomposition
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A tree decomposition of G is a pair (T,B) where T is a tree and
B = {B(i) : i ∈ V (T )} is a family of subsets of V (G), called bags, one for each vertex of T , satisfying
the following:
1. For each (u, v) ∈ E, there is at least one bag B ∈ B such that (u, v) ∈ B.
2. If i 6= j 6= k ∈ V (T ) are such that k is on the unique path from i to j in T then B(i)∩B(j) ⊆ B(k).
Note that the second property implies that, for any vertex u ∈ V (G), the bags which contain u
form a subtree of T . We will sometimes abuse notation and denote by B both a vertex of V (T ) and
the bag corresponding to it.
The width of a tree decomposition (T,B) is max{|B| − 1 : B ∈ B}. The treewidth of G is the
minimum integer ω such that there is a tree decomposition of G of width ω.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph and (T,B) be a tree decomposition of G of width ω. Wlog we can
assume that, for each pair of bags B,B′ adjacent in T , B ∩ B′ is a vertex separator of G. Form a
directed rooted tree by picking an arbitrary vertex as the root and orienting the remaining edges
towards the root, and call this a directed tree decomposition. In the directed tree, each node X other
than the root node has exactly one successor S(B), i.e., there exists exactly one node S(B) such
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that (B,S(B)) is an arc of the directed tree decomposition. If B is the root, we set S(B) = ∅. We
also say that B is a predecessor of S(B) and notice that a bag may have multiple predecessors, and
has none if and only if it is a leaf of T .
Dichotomic tree decomposition. Let G be a graph and (T,B) a directed tree decomposition of G of
width ω. We can transform the directed tree decomposition of G it into a directed tree decompo-
sition of the same graph and width where every node has indegree at most 2. We call such a tree
decomposition dichotomic. Indeed, suppose edges (B1, B), (B2, B), . . . , (Bt, B) with t ≥ 3 are part of
the directed tree decomposition. Then we can create a copy B¯ of B, add edge (B¯, B), and split the
edges entering B as follows: (B1, B¯), . . . , (Bdt/2e, B¯) and (Bdt/2e+1, B), . . . , (Bt, B). The indegree of
X and X¯ is at most bt/2c+ 1 < t. Notice that the digraph we obtain is still a tree decomposition of
G, since each edge of G is still covered by a bag, and the bags which contain any vertex v ∈ G still
form a continuous subtree.
If we repeat the above operation for a non-dichotomic tree once for each original node of indegree
at least 3, the maximum indegree over all nodes of the tree goes from t > 2 to bt/2c+ 1, while the
number of nodes is at most doubled. Hence, we can iterate the operation so as to obtain a tree
decomposition with at most a quadratic number of vertices, all of which have indegree at most 2.
From here on, we assume without loss of generality that our directed tree decomposition is
dichotomic. Let T ′ be a subtree of T , and V (T ′) the set of nodes contained in at least a bag of T ′.
We say that T ′ is a closed subtree of T if B ∈ V (T ′) and B′ is a predecessor of B, then B′ belongs
to T ′. By connectivity, for each node B of a closed subtree T ′, S(B) also belongs to T ′, with the
exception of at most one node that we call the head of T ′ and denoted by H(T ′). If T ′ 6= T , the
successor of H(T ′) exists and it is also called the successor of T ′ and denoted by S(T ′). Note that
each bag B is the head of exactly one closed subtree of T , that we denote by TB .
Remark 1. Let (T,B) be a dichotomic directed tree decomposition. Then the following holds: let T ′
be a closed subtree of T and B be the head of T ′. The removal of B partitions T ′ \B in at most 2
closed subtrees. The successor of each of those subtrees is B.
6.5 The algorithm
We now give our algorithm for computing a minimum weight popular matching, see Algorithm 1.
Note that Algorithm 1 relies on the subroutine Update described in Algorithm 2, and the implemen-
tations of some other subroutines are not completely defined. We give a formal description of those
together with a complexity analysis in the proof of Theorem 17.
Algorithm 1 takes as input a graph G with strict preference lists as usual, and a dichotomic
directed tree decomposition (T,B) of G. It iteratively constructs the sequence of closed subtrees TB
of T , with the first TB corresponding to a leaf B of T , and the last to the root. For each TB , let
S = B ∩ S(B) and X = V (TB) \ S. The algorithm constructs and stores in LB all the pairs (M, T ),
where T is an (S,X)-tipping point and M is the T -leader. This set can be found by building on the
corresponding sets for the (at most two) predecessors of B. Finally, of all matchings M such that
(M, T ) ∈ LB – with B being the root – the one of minimum cost is output. If at the end of any
iteration when a bag B is flagged, we have LB = ∅, we deduce that G has no popular matching.
With a little abuse of notation, we will write M ∈ LB if (M, T ) ∈ LB for some T . Similarly, we
write LB = LB ∪ {M} to mean that (M, T ) is added to LB for an appropriate T , and similarly for
LB \ {M}.
6.6 Analysis
The goal of this section is to prove the following result.
Theorem 17. Algorithm 1 is correct. If the treewidth of G = (V,E) is upper bounded by a con-
stant ω, then it can be implemented to run in time O(|V |3ω+7).
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Algorithm 1
Require: A graph G, together with, for each node v ∈ V , a strict ranking of the neighbors of v. A dichotomic
directed tree decomposition (T,B) of G.
Ensure: A popular matching of minimum cost in G.
1: For all B ∈ B, label B as unflagged.
2: Choose an unflagged bag B whose predecessors are flagged, and flag B.
3: Let TB be the closed subtree of T whose head is B, and set LB = ∅.
4: Let S = B ∩ S(B), X = V (TB) \ S.
5: if B has no predecessor in T then
6: for all B-matchings M∗ of G do
7: if M∗ is an (S,X)-locally popular matching then
8: Update(M∗, LB)
9: end if
10: end for
11: else
12: Let S1 = B ∩B1 and (possibly) S2 = B ∩B2, where B1 and (possibly) B2 are the predecessors of B.
13: for all B-matchings M of G, all M1 ∈ LB1 and (possibly) M2 ∈ LB2 do
14: if (M1)S1 = MS1 and (possibly) (M2)S2 = MS2 then
15: Let M∗ = M ∪M1 ∪M2
16: if M∗ is an (S,X)-locally popular matching of G then
17: Update(M∗, LB)
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end if
22: if LB = ∅ then
23: output: G has no popular matching.
24: else if there is a bag B ∈ B that is unflagged then
25: Go to Step 2.
26: end if
27: Let B be the head of T . Output the matching of minimum cost from LB .
We assume throughout the proof that every bag B that is not a leaf has two predecessors, as
the (simpler) case where some B has only one predecessor follows in a similar fashion. For a bag
B we write S := B ∩ S(B) and X := V (TB) \ S; if B is not a leaf, we denote by B1 and B2
its predecessors, and write Si := B ∩ Bi, Xi = V (TBi) \ Si for i = 1, 2. We start by proving the
correctness of Algorithm 1. We show that, at the end of the iteration where bag B is flagged,
(∗) LB contains exactly all T -leaders, for all (S,X)-tipping points T for which a T -leader exists.
Suppose (∗) is proved. Then, when B is the root, LB contains only popular matchings (by Proposi-
tion 1), and the one of minimum cost among those is the popular matching of minimum cost. Again
by Proposition 1, if LB = ∅ at the end of the iteration where B is flagged, then G has no popular
matching, and the output of Algorithm 1 is again correct.
The proof of (∗) is by induction on the number of nodes nB of TB . If nB = 1, then the condition
from the if statement in Step 5 is verified. In this case, the statement is immediate, since we
enumerate over all possible B-matchings of G, check those that are (S,X)-locally popular, and
for each (S,X)-tipping point T , keep the (S,X)-locally popular matching of minimum cost active
at T .
Now suppose nB > 1. By induction hypothesis, for i = 1, 2, all matchings that are stored in LBi
are exactly all T -leaders, for all (Si, Xi)-tipping points T for which a T -leader exists (i.e., there is
at least a (Si, Xi)-locally popular matching active at T ). Now let T be an (S,X)-tipping point for
which a T -leader Mˆ exists. It suffices to show that one of the matchings M∗ constructed at Step 15
is indeed Mˆ .
Since Mˆ is (S,X)-locally popular and Xi ∪Si ⊆ X ∪S, matching Mi := MˆXi∪Si is also (Si, Xi)-
locally popular by Proposition 1. By Lemma 17, Mi is a (Si, Xi)-leader. By induction, Mi ∈ LBi .
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Algorithm 2 Update
Require: M∗, LB
Let T be the (S,X)-tipping point of M∗.
if there exists M ′ ∈ LB whose tipping point is T then
if c(M∗) < c(M ′) then
Set LB = LB \ {M ′} ∪ {M∗}.
end if
else
Set LB = LB ∪ {M∗}.
end if
On the other hand, M := MˆB is a B-matching of G such that MSi = (Mi)Si for i = 1, 2. Since
we enumerate all B-matchings of G, as well as all matchings from LB1 and LB2 , matching Mˆ is
eventually enumerated.
Running time analysis. We now bound the running time of Algorithm 1. We will use the following
general fact proved in the claim below: if we are given an (X ∪ S)-matching M in a graph H and
|X ∪S| is bounded, then one can check (S,X)-local popularity of M . If M is (S,X)-locally popular,
then we can efficiently find the (S,X)-tipping point at which M is active.
Claim 6 Let H = (U,F ) be a graph, S a vertex separator of H, X a connected component of H \S.
Let M be a (X ∪S)-matching of H. Assume |X ∪S| is upper bounded by a constant. Then in O(|F |)
time one can:
1. check if M is (S,X)-locally popular in H and, if it is,
2. find the (S,X)-tipping point (in H) at which M is active.
Proof. Building graph HM [X ∪S] takes O(|F |) time. Since |X ∪S| is upper bounded by a constant,
it takes constant time to enumerate all paths and cycles of HM [X ∪ S], and to check if any of these
violates the definition of (S,X)-local popularity. In case M is indeed (S,X)-locally popular, for any
family of paths P in HM [X∪S] and (S,X)-configurations C, one can check in constant time if P is a
certificate for M at C. Since by Proposition 2 the number of (S,X)-configurations is upper bounded
by g(ω + 1), which is a constant by hypothesis, the claim follows. ♦
Observe that |B| ≤ ω + 1, so enumerating all B-matchings takes time O(|V |ω+1). Because of
Claim 6 and Step 7 (in Algorithm 1), finding the tipping point of any B-matching M∗ can be
performed in time O(|E|) = O(|V |2). Moreover, once the tipping point of M∗ is computed, the
Update function can be implemented to run in time O(|V |ω+1), since LB at each step will contain
at most one matching per tipping point, and by Proposition 2, there are at most g(ω + 1)|V |ω+1
many tipping points.
We conclude that, when nB = 1, the iteration when B is flagged runs in time O(|V |2ω+2). We
now prove, by induction on nB , that the iteration when any B is flagged can also be implemented
to run in time O(|V |3ω+5), the base case having been just proved. Multiplying this by O(|V |2) (the
number of bags of the tree decomposition), we obtain the desired bound.
Assume nB > 1. Because of what was discussed above, given an (S,X)-configuration C and a
matching M∗ = M ∪M1 ∪M2, where M is a B-matching of G and for i = 1, 2 Mi ∈ LBi , it is
enough to give an upper bound on the time needed to decide if M∗ is (S,X)-locally popular and if
it is active at C. Recall that the number of B-matchings is O(|V |ω+1), while |LBi | = O(|V |ω+1) and
the number of (S,X)-configuration is at most g(ω + 1) by Proposition 2.
The condition from Step 14 can be verified in time O(|E|). Hence, we assume that (M1)S1 = MS1
and (M2)S2 = MS2 . We start with a simple claim.
Claim 7 For i = 1, 2, let Ci = (Ui, Li, Πi) be a configuration at which Mi is active, and let Pi be a
certificate of Ci at Mi. Then all paths from P1,P2 are pairwise internally vertex-disjoint.
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Proof. By definition of certificate, paths from P1 are pairwise internally vertex-disjoint, and similarly
so are paths from P2. Now let P1 ∈ P1, P2 ∈ P2. For i = 1, 2, Pi ⊆ V (TBi) and Pi is an Si-path.
Since V (TB1) ∩ V (TB2) ⊆ S1 ∪ S2, the claim follows. ♦
Now fix an (S1, X1)-configuration C1 = (U1, L1, Π1) in G at which M1 is active, and an (S2, X2)-
configuration C2 = (U2, L2, Π2) in G at which M2 is active. Consider the graph H and matching
MH obtained as follows. Start from H = GM [B] and the corresponding matching MH = M [B], and
let (u, v) be the first pair from U1. Assume u, v are matched by MH , `1 = (0, 1), pi1 = (0, 0), the
other cases following in a similar fashion. Add to H and MH new nodes u
′, w′, z′, v′, matching edges
(u′, w′), (z′, v′), (+,+) edge (w′, z′), and (+,−) edges (u, u′) and (v, v′). Note that (u, u′, w′, z′, v′, v)
is a MH -alternating S1-path of parity pi1 and level `1 starting at u and ending at v. We call it the
shortcut of the path with endpoints u, v. Repeat this for all pairs from U1 and U2, adding at each
time new nodes and an appropriate path. Note that this adds to H a bounded number of nodes.
This means that the graph H and matching MH can be constructed in time O(|E|).
Claim 8 Let M∗ be an (S ∪ X)-matching. M∗ is not an (S,X)-locally popular matching in G if
and only if there exist an (Si, Xi)-configuration Ci at which Mi is active for i = 1, 2, such that, if we
construct graph H and matching MH as above, then MH is not (S, V (H) \ S)-locally popular in H.
Proof. Consider the forbidden subgraph P (from Theorem 1) of GM∗ [X∪S], whose existence certifies
that M∗ is not (S,X)-locally popular in G, and take P that is minimal with this property. Using an
immediate modification to Algorithm 3 (given in Section 6.7), we can write P as the juxtaposition
of (P1, P2, . . . , Pk) where each Pj is: either an Si-path contained in G[Xi ∪ Si] for i ∈ {1, 2}, or a
path contained in G[B]. Collect all such S1-paths from (P1, . . . , Pk) not contained in G[B] in P1,
and all S2-paths from (P1, . . . , Pk) not contained in G[B] in P2. One easily checks that Pi form the
certificate of a certain (Si, Xi)-configuration Ci at Mi.
Now consider the graph H and matching MH obtained from configurations C1 and C2. By re-
placing each path from P1 and P2 with the corresponding shortcut, we deduce that MH is not an
(S, V (H) \ S)-locally popular matching in H.
The opposite direction follows in a similar (inverse) fashion: start from a forbidden path in H
that certifies that MH is not (S, V (H) \ S)-locally popular in H, write it as (P1, . . . , ..., Pk), replace
each of those subpaths with the appropriate certificate paths so as to obtain an M∗-alternating
forbidden path by Claim 7. ♦
The proof of the following claim follows in a similar fashion to the proof of Claim 8.
Claim 9 Let M∗ be an (S,X)-locally popular matching in G and let C be an (S,X)-configuration.
Then M∗ is active at C if and only if there exist a (Si, Xi)-configuration Ci at which Mi is active
for i = 1, 2 such that if we construct graph H and matching MH , then MH is active at C (here we
interpret C as an (S, V (H) \ S)-configuration in H, which is allowed since S ⊆ V (H)).
Because of Claim 8, we can check if M∗ is an (S,X)-locally popular matching in G by checking,
for each pair of (Si, Xi)-configurations Ci at which Mi is active for i = 1, 2, if the corresponding MH
is (S, V (H) \ S)-locally popular in H. For i = 1, 2, the number of (Si, Xi)-configurations is at most
g(ω+ 1). Since the number of nodes of H is bounded (we start with a bounded set of nodes and we
add a bounded number of new nodes), testing if MH is (S, V (H) \ S)-locally popular in H can be
done in time O(|E|) = O(|V |2) by Claim 6. Similarly, if M∗ is (S,X)-locally popular in G, we can
find its tipping point in time O(|V |2) by repeatedly applying Claims 9 and 6. Hence, the iteration
when B is flagged can be performed in time O(|V |3ω+5). This concludes the proof of Theorem 17.
6.7 Proof of Lemma 17
Let N be the (S,X)-locally popular matching that is the T -leader. This implies that MS = NS , and
N is a (X ∪ S)-matching. Define N ′ := N ∪ (M ′ \M), and notice this is a disjoint union. Hence,
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N ′X∪S = N . We will now show that N
′ is a (S′, X ′)-locally popular matching whose (S′∪X ′)-tipping
point is T ′. We then have:
c(N ′) = c(N) + c(N ′ \N) < c(M) + c(M ′ \M) = c(M ′),
concluding the proof. We start with some claims, the first two of which immediately follow from
construction.
Claim 10 GM ′ [X ∪ S] = GM [X ∪ S] and GN ′ [X ∪ S] = GN [X ∪ S].
Claim 11 M ′ = M ∪ (N ′ \N), and the latter is a disjoint union.
Claim 12 Let e ∈ E not be incident to a node of X.
a) e ∈ N ′ if and only if e ∈M ′.
b) Let e /∈ N ′. Then e ∈ E(GN ′) if and only if e ∈ E(GM ′). Moreover, if e ∈ E(GN ′), then it has
the same labels in GN ′ and in GM ′ .
Proof. a) Suppose e ∈ N ′. If e ∈ N , then e ∈ NS = MS ⊆ M ⊆ M ′, where equality holds by
hypothesis and inclusions by definition. Else, e ∈ (N ′ \N) ⊆M ′. The argument can be reversed to
show the opposite direction.
b) Suppose e = (u, v) /∈ N ′. By part a), e /∈ M ′. If u /∈ S, then N ′(u) = M ′(u) by part a). We
deduce that the label of e at u coincides in M ′ and N ′. If instead u ∈ S, then the label of e at u in
GM and GN coincide by Proposition 3. The claim follows since M
′
S = MS = NS = N
′
S . ♦
Claim 13 N ′ is an (X ′ ∪ S′)-matching of G.
Proof. Let us first show that it is a matching of G. Recall that M ′X∪S = M . Hence, M
′ \M has
no edge incident to X ∪ S. Since by hypothesis N is an (X ∪ S)-matching, N has no edge incident
to nodes other than X ∪ S. Hence N ′ is the union of two node-disjoint matchings of G, hence a
matching.
Now by hypothesis, S ∪X ⊆ S′ ∪X ′. Hence, N has no edge in G \ (S′ ∪X ′). Moreover, M ′ is
by hypothesis an (S′, X ′)-locally popular matching, so it is an (S′ ∪X ′)-matching. Hence, N ′ is an
(S′ ∪X ′)-matching. ♦
Claim 14 Let k ∈ N and P 1, . . . , P k ∈ PM ′ be pairwise internally vertex-disjoint and X-disjoint.
Assume that, for j ∈ [k], path P j is of level `j ∈ {0, 1, 2}×{0, 1} and parity Πj ∈ {0, 1}×{0, 1}, that
every node appears at most twice in P 1 . . . , P k, no pair of paths have exactly the same endpoints,
and no path is contained in X. Then there exist pairwise internally vertex-disjoint and X-disjoint
paths Q1, . . . , Qk ∈ PN ′ with the following properties:
1. For j ∈ [k], Qj is of level `j and parity Πj, and P j ∩ S′ = Qj ∩ S′.
2. For j ∈ [k], let uj (resp. vj) be the first (resp. last) node of P j. If uj (resp. vj) /∈ X, then uj
(resp. vj) is the first (resp. last) node of Q
j. If uj (resp. vj) ∈ X, the first (resp. last) node of
Qj also belongs to X.
Moreover,
3. 1,2 also hold if we switch the roles of M ′ and N ′.
Proof. The proof of the claim will only assume that M and N are (S,X)-locally popular matchings
with the same (S,X)-tipping point. Recall that N ′ = N ∪ (M ′ \ M), M ′ = M ∪ (N ′ \ N) (by
Claim 11), and that those unions are disjoint. Therefore, the roles of M and N (hence those of M ′
and N ′) can be exchanged and the conclusions preserved. This proves 3 (assuming 1,2).
Let us consider any path P from P 1, . . . , P k, where we omit the superscript for the sake of read-
ability. If P∩X = ∅, we write P∞ := P . Else, we write P as the juxtaposition of P0, P1, P2, . . . , Pq, P∞,
defined through the procedure described in Algorithm 3. Note that some of those paths may consist
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Algorithm 3
1: Let v be the first vertex of P .
2: if v ∈ X then
3: Let P0 = {v} and u = v.
4: else
5: Let u′ be the first vertex of P that is contained in X, and u the predecessor of u′ in P . Note that
u ∈ S. Let P0 be the subpath of P between v and u (possibly u = v and P0 = {u}).
6: end if
7: Let i = 1.
8: Starting from u, traverse P until the first node v ∈ S, v 6= u is encountered.
9: if such v does not exist then
10: Set q = i− 1 and go to Step 21.
11: else
12: Let Pi be the subpath between u and v. Set i = i+ 1 and u = v.
13: Starting from u, traverse P until the first node u′ ∈ X is encountered.
14: if such u′ does not exist then
15: Set q = i− 1 and go to Step 21.
16: else
17: Let Pi be the subpath of P between u and the predecessor v of u
′ in P . Note that v ∈ S and
possibly v = u.
18: Set u = v, i = i+ 1, and go to Step 8.
19: end if
20: end if
21: Let P∞ be the subpath of P between u and the last node of P .
22: Output P0, P1, . . . , Pq, P∞.
of a single node. We call them trivial. Note that a trivial path can be removed from the juxtaposition
without changing the resulting P . Hence, in the following, we assume that all paths are non-trivial
(without changing the subscripts of the remaining non-trivial paths), and we let q be the subscript
of the last non-trivial path (other than ∞).
The following fact immediately holds by construction.
Fact 1 Let {Pi}i∈[q]∪{0,∞} be the output of Algorithm 3 on input P = P j for some j ∈ [k]. Then:
(i) P is the juxtaposition of P0, P1, . . . , Pq, P∞. (ii) For all i ∈ [q] ∪ {0,∞}, Pi ∈ PM ′ . (iii) For
i ∈ N, i ≥ 2, the first and last nodes of Pi belong to S. (iv) For i ∈ N, i odd, Pi is an S-path and
Pi ⊆ X ∪S. (v) For i even, Pi∩X = ∅. (vi) Assume q ≥ 1. Then P1 ends at a node of S, and starts
either at a node of X (if the if condition in Step 2 of Algorithm 3 is satisfied), or at a node of S
(otherwise). (vii) If P∞ ∩X 6= ∅, then P∞ is an S-path of GM ′ [X ∪ S] ending at some node of X.
Let us call a subpath Pi of P hidden if i ≡ 1 mod 2 or i =∞ and P∞ ∩X 6= ∅ (i.e., condition (vii)
above is verified). Now consider the collection of paths {P ji } defined above, for j ∈ [k]5.
Fact 2 Consider the family of paths {P ji } with j ∈ [k]. Then:
1. {P ji } is a collection of pairwise internally vertex-disjoint paths and each node appears at most
twice in the collection.
2. The restriction of the collection {P ji } to hidden paths is a family of pairwise X-disjoint S-paths
from PM , and the level of each of those path is not ∞.
3. If P ji ∩ P j
′
i′ 6= ∅, then either (a) j = j′ and (|i − i′| ≤ 1 or i, i′ ∈ {qj ,∞}), or (b) i (resp. i′) is
the first or last path of the juxtaposition leading to P j (resp. P j
′
).
Proof. Part 1 follows from hypothesis, the fact that paths P j , j ∈ [k] form a collection of pairwise
internally vertex-disjoint paths and Fact 1.
5 We introduced the superscripts back, to distinguish the paths produced by applying Algorithm 3 to
P 1, . . . , P k.
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We now prove part 2. Restrict the collection {P ji } to hidden paths. We already argued in Fact 1
that those are S-paths. As they are subpaths of M ′-alternating paths, they are also M ′-alternating.
Using again Fact 1, they are contained in X ∪ S. Using Claim 10, we deduce they are paths from
PM . The fact that they are X-disjoint follows by hypothesis for j 6= j′, and by Fact 1 for j = j′. The
fact that M ′ is (S′, X ′)-locally popular implies that they cannot be of level ∞. This proves part 2.
We now prove part 3. Let P ji ∩P j
′
i′ 6= ∅. If j = j′, by Fact 1 the only possibility is that P ji , P ji′ are
consecutive paths in the juxtaposition leading to P . This is case (a) in 3. Else, j 6= j′ and case (b)
follows from the fact that P j and P j
′
are internally vertex-disjoint, concluding the proof of 3. ♦
Consider the collection of hidden paths {P ji } for j ∈ [k], and let uji (resp. vji ) be the first (resp. last)
node of each of those paths. Consider C = (U,L,Π) defined as follows: U is the ordered collection
of pairs:
– (uj1, v
j
1) if the first node of P
j
1 belongs to S, and (∅, vj1) otherwise.
– (uji , v
j
i ) for i ≥ 3 odd and
– (uj∞, ∅) if P j∞ is hidden.
L is the ordered collection of levels `ji of the hidden paths P
j
i , while Π is the ordered collection of
their parities. Using Fact 1, Fact 2 and the hypothesis, one easily verifies the following.
Fact 3 C is an (S,X)-configuration. M is active at C, and the collection of hidden paths {P ji } for
j ∈ [k] is a certificate of C at M .
By hypothesis, N is also active at C. Hence, for all pairs (i, j) such that P ji is hidden, we can
find pairwise X-disjoint S-paths Qji ∈ PN , with each P ji starting (resp. ending) at node uji (resp.
vji ) if this belongs to S, and at a node of X otherwise, of the appropriate level and parity.
For j ∈ [k], recall that P j is the juxtaposition of (P j0 , P j1 , . . . , P jqj , P j∞), from which we removed
the trivial paths. Consider the path Qj obtained by replacing, in the juxtaposition above, each
hidden path P ji with the corresponding Q
j
i . We conclude the proof of the claim by showing that the
collection of Qj , j ∈ [k], satisfies the claim.
Fix j ∈ [k]. Let us first argue that Qj is a path in G that satisfies property 2 from the statement
of the claim. Note that, by construction, for all hidden P ji , the first (resp. last) vertex of P
j
i coincides
with the first (resp. last) vertex of Qji , with possibly the exception of the first vertex of P
j
0 (resp.
last vertex of P j∞) if it belongs to X. Moreover, since all Q
j
i are pairwise X-disjoint S-paths with
no edge in G \X, each Qj is a path in G. The statement follows.
Let us now argue that Qj is N ′-alternating. Since N ′[(X ′ ∪ S′) \X] = M ′[(X ′ ∪ S′) \X] and all
P ji that are not hidden are M
′-alternating and do not intersect X, we conclude that all such P ji are
also N ′-alternating. For each hidden P ji , Q
j
i is an N -alternating path in GN [X ∪S] by construction.
Since GN [X ∪ S] = GN ′ [X ∪ S] by Claim 10, each Qij is also N ′-alternating. By construction, the
parity of each hidden P ji coincides with that of the corresponding Q
j
i . We conclude that each Q
j is
N ′-alternating.
Let us now show that Qj ∈ PN ′ , and it is of the same level and parity of P j . Let P ji be non-
hidden. By Fact 1, it is contained in G[X ′ ∪ S′] \ X. By Claim 12, P ji ∩ N ′ = P ji ∩M ′, and each
edge from P ji \ N ′ has the same labels in GM ′ [X ′ ∪ S′] and GN ′ [X ′ ∪ S′]. Now consider a hidden
path P ji . By construction, Q
j
i is a path of GN [X ∪ S] = GN ′ [X ∪ S] of the same parity and level of
P ji . The statement follows.
Now observe that property 1 of the claim holds, since the hypothesis X ⊆ X ′ implies S′∩X = ∅,
hence we have:
Qj ∩ S′ = (Qj ∩ (S′ ∩ S)) ∪ (Qj ∩ (S′ \ S)) = (P j ∩ (S′ ∩ S)) ∪ (P j ∩ (S′ \ S)) = P j ∩ S′.
Finally, let us observe thatQ1, . . . , Qk are internally vertex-disjoint andX-disjoint. TheX-disjointness
follows from the fact that all Qji corresponding to hidden P
j
i are X-disjoint, while other P
j
i do not
intersect X by Fact 1. The fact that Q1, . . . , Qk are pairwise internally vertex-disjoint follows from
Fact 2. ♦
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In order to conclude the proof of the lemma, we need to prove that N ′ is a (S′, X ′)-locally popular
matching whose tipping point is T ′.
(S′, X ′)-local popularity. Let us first show that N ′ is (S′, X ′)-locally popular. Suppose it is not, then
there exists a forbidden path or cycle P as in item (i), (ii), or (iii) from Theorem 1 that is contained
in GN ′ [S
′ ∪ X ′]. Since (by Claim 10) GN [X ∪ S] = GN ′ [X ∪ S] and v ∈ X ∪ S is N -exposed if
and only if it is N ′-exposed, we deduce P 6⊆ X ∪ S, else N would not be (S,X)-locally popular, a
contradiction.
Suppose P is a path: take one that is inclusionwise minimal among all paths that certify that
N ′ is not (S′, X ′)-locally popular. We can then write P as the juxtaposition of (P 1, P 2) of levels
`1, `2 6=∞, so that the first node of P 2 (which coincides with the last node of P 1) does not belong
to X. Clearly P 1, P 2 satisfy the hypothesis of Claim 14 with the roles of N ′ and M ′ exchanged
and k = 2. Let Q1, Q2 be the paths whose existence is guaranteed by the claim. We claim that the
juxtaposition of (Q1, Q2) is a forbidden path in GM ′ [X
′ ∪ S′], a contradiction.
First, observe that the last node of Q1 coincides with the last node of P 1 (since the latter does
not belong to X) which coincides with the first node of P 2, which coincides with the first node of
Q2 (again, since it does not belong to X). We now argue that P 1 and P 2 have no other node in
common. We know they are internally vertex-disjoint and X-disjoint. Hence, if the first node of P 1
or the last node of P 2 belongs to X, we are done. Suppose not. Then, by Claim 14, the first node of
Q1 is the first node of P 1, which is different by hypothesis (P is a path) from the last node of P 2,
which coincides, again by Claim 14, with the last node of Q2. Hence, the juxtaposition of (Q1, Q2)
is a path of G, that we denote by Q. Again by Claim 14, Q1, Q2 ∈ PM ′ . Moreover, the parity and
level of Q1 (resp. Q2) coincide with the parity and level of P 1 (resp. P 2). Hence Q ∈ PM ′ is the
required forbidden path, obtaining the desired contradiction.
The argument when P is a cycle follows in a similar fashion, writing P as the juxtaposition of
(P 1, P 2, P 3) with P 1 ∩ X = P 2 ∩ X = ∅, and the endpoints of P3 lying in S (note that we can
assume that P contains exactly one (+,+) edge, else it also contains a path with two (+,+) edges
and we are back to the previous case).
Tipping point. Let us now show that T ′ is the tipping point of N ′. First, observe that X ⊆ X ′
implies S′ ∩X = ∅. For v ∈ S′ ∩ S, we know that N ′(v) = N(v) = M(v) = M ′(v). For v ∈ S′ \ S,
we have N ′(v) = M ′(v) by construction. Hence N ′S′ = M
′
S′ . Now let C = {U,L,Π} be a (S′, X ′)-
configuration at which M ′ is active, with U as in (1). We will show that N ′ is also active at C. A
symmetric argument shows that, if N ′ is active at C, then so is M ′, concluding the proof.
Take paths P 1, . . . , P k that are the certificate of C at M ′. We claim that those paths satisfy
the hypothesis of Claim 14. They are, by construction, S′-paths that are pairwise X ′-disjoint. This
implies that they are pairwise internally vertex-disjoint and X-disjoint (using again X ∩ S′ = ∅).
The X ′-disjointness implies that each node from X ′ appears at most once. Moreover, again by
construction, each node from S′ appears at most twice. Hence, every node appears at most twice in
P 1, . . . , P k. Moreover, by definition of U , no two paths have the same endpoints.
Let Q1, . . . , Qk ∈ PN ′ be the paths whose existence is guaranteed by Claim 14. We show that
Q1, . . . , Qk are the certificate of C at N ′, concluding the proof. Fix j ∈ [k]. The parity and level of
Qj is the same as that of P j . Hence, the parity of Qj is Πj , and its level `j . Recall that Q
j is an
S′-path. By property 2 of Claim 14, Qj starts (resp. ends) at the same node as P j when this belongs
to S′, and at some node of X ′ otherwise. Using property 1 of Claim 14, we deduce that Qj is a
S′-path that starts (resp. ends) at uj (resp. vj) when uj 6= ∅ (resp. vj 6= ∅), and at a node x ∈ X ′
otherwise.
We are left to show that paths {Qj}j=1,...,k are X ′-disjoint. Suppose not, then there exists v ∈ X ′,
j 6= j′ such that v ∈ Qj ∩ Qj′ . Note that v cannot be an internal node of Qj or Qj′ , since those
paths are pairwise internally vertex-disjoint by construction. On the other hand, if v is an endpoint
of both Qj and Qj
′
, then the statement either follows from the X-disjointness of Qj and Qj
′
, or by
property 2 of Claim 14. uunionsq
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